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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is an historical study of the racially 
charged context in which public schools in Little Rock, 
Arkansas were 'desegregated' between 1954 and 1964. The 
author first examines the Supreme Court's landmark decision 
of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954), in which 
racially segregated public schools were declared 
unconstitutional. The central focus of the study, however, 
is on the paternalistic and unequal nature of southern race 
relations and their impact on the desegregation process in 
Little Rock, Arkansas between 1954 and 1964. 
Utilizing archival manuscripts and secondary 
sources, the author explicitly challenges the established 
historical interpretation of school desegregation in Little 
Rock and the Little Rock crisis of 1957-1958. In those 
accounts, the Little Rock crisis is viewed at its core as a 
political/constitutional crisis that was resolved once 
President Eisenhower dispatched federal troops to Little 
Rock, paving the way for desegregation to proceed at Little 
Rock Central High School. The author argues that the 
Little Rock crisis was an extension of a much larger crisis 
in race relations. Black demands for equal and integrated 
public schools and a white refusal to grant African 
ii 
Americans their constitutional rights precipitated this 
structural crisis in race relations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We are not asking for love. We are DEMANDING the 
rights and privileges as guaranteed any American 
citizen under the Constitution of the United States. 
1 Daisy Bates, 2 May 1958 
On 2 May 1958 Daisy Bates, president of the Little 
Rock chapter of the NAACP and principle in the fight for 
school integration in that city, gave a speech on the new 
black civil rights leader of the 1950's, whom she called, 
"The New Negro." Speaking to an audience at the People's 
Community Church in Detroit, Michigan, she discussed the 
impact that the Brown decision had on race relations in 
Little Rock, Arkansas. She especially focused on the 
'new' position of black citizens of Little Rock who had 
begun to question the paternalistic nature of those 
relations. Unlike southern white officials who were 
lamenting the court's ruling as "a great blow to the Negro 
race" that was "destroying the amicable relations between 
the white and Negro races," Bates focused on the 
psychological benefits (to blacks) of the Brown decision. 
Describing Little Rock prior to 1957, Bates called the 
capital city "praiseworthy, quiet, peaceful and rather 
aggressive --It gave the impression as a part of the New 
South." She acknowledged, "Little did I know then that it 
was not a changed Little Rock, Arkansas, but a new Negro 
2 
who appeared on the surface." 
Daisy Bates was the very embodiment of the 'new 
Negro.' No longer willing to partake in bi-racial meetings 
in which whites led and blacks followed, she led a local 
movement to desegregate public schools. As a leader of 
the local NAACP armed with the Brown decision, in 1956 she 
led a group of parents of black children in pressing the 
Little Rock School Board to develop an equitable plan for 
desegregation. Shut out on the local level, they turned 
to the courts, pressing their claims for full citizenship 
in the area of public education in Aaron v. Cooper. 
Rather than a 'New South', Bates soon realized that "we 
are dealing with a confused South and a New Negro." The 
term 'New South' held a different meaning for Bates and 
other southern blacks than it did for whites. Bates 
recognized African American demands for full citizenship 
as the embodiment of the spirit of the New South~ On 23 
September 1957, Daisy Bates witnessed the New South in 
action as she watched nine black students enter previousl · 
whites-only Central High School for the first time. 
That morning, I observed courage rarely seen in my 
lifetime. I realized that these parents represented 
the spirit of the New South, and in a quiet, 
dignified manner, were serving notice on America 
that "We are a determined people, willing to pay th! 
price that our children might enjoy true democracy. 
Hence, from 1956 to 1958 black citizens of Little Rock 
2 
were beginning to redefine the New South and the terms 
under which race relations evolve. 
Few books specifically devoted to the Little Rock 
situation of the 1950's have been published. Of these, 
many have been written by individuals directly involved in 
h . . 4 t e crisis. In these books, as in other books on post-
World War II civil rights movements that include the 
Little Rock situation, authors tended to focus on the 
political dimensions of desegregating schools in Little 
Rock. Hence, the Little Rock crisis was often interpreted 
at its core as a mere political crisis or as a 
constitutional . crisis prompted by a state governor 
thwarting federal authority. The crisis as it was defined 
often began on 3 September 1957, the day on which Governor 
Orval Faubus ordered the Arkansas National Guard to 
surround Central High School and to prevent black students 
from entering the school. The climactic scene came on 24 
September 1957, the day on which President Eisenhower 
called in federal troops on the principle of 'law and 
order', thus allowing desegregation to proceed. The story 
ended on 17 May 1958, the day on which the last of the 
federalized National Guard were withdrawn from Central 
High School. However, this is not to suggest that each 
author's argument remained indistinguishable from the 
next. Each emphasized different aspects and causes of the 
crisis, but one thing remained constant: the view that the 
Little Rock situation was a political crisis. 5 
3 
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In It Happened Here, a book on Little Rock authored 
by Superintendent of Little Rock Schools Virgil Blossom, 
the author's argument, posited in the above framework, 
centered on the question of whether or not desegregation 
would have proceeded peacefully had Governor Faubus not 
intervened. His conclusion, of course, was affirmative. 
Little Rock did not bring on disaster. Disaster was 
deliberately thrust upon a majority of progressive 
and law abiding citizens by extrgmists and outsiders 
seeking to serve their own ends. 
He maintained that despite the school board's best 
efforts, Governor Faubus's actions encouraged outside 
interference in the desegregation process, thus causing 
the crisis. According the Blossom, 
even the fact that most of the people of Little Rock 
originally were ready to accept our integration plan 
worked against us i~ the end, because we did not 
expect trouble and were surprised and unprepared 
when, as I ha~e related, trouble was thrust upon us 
by outsiders. 
In this view, the Little Rock School Board and the larger 
white community, and not the black community most affected 
by events in Little rock, were the victims. 8 
Daisy Bates is more critical of the school board in 
her autobiography, The Long Shadow of Little Rock. Even 
though her account goes up to the 1962-1963 school year, 
she too posits her story in the formula of a political 
crisis. Leading up to the day Faubus called out the 
troops, she recalled, 
everywhere in Little Rock there were rumors that 
segregationist forces from hard-core states, the so-
called 'solid South," were organizing for a fight to 
the finish against integration in public education. 
4 
Little Rock was to be the battleground. 9 
However, unlike the other first person accounts of the 
events in Little Rock, hers took a wider view. She placed 
Little Rock within a history of American racism: 
More than any other single event in many years, 
Little Rock demonstrated the gaping discrepancy 
between the Declaration of Independence--one of the 
precious documents of American History--and the 
reality of twentieth century America. Despite 
professions of equality, America and Americans 
exercise racial discrimination against millions of 
dark Americap 0citizens practically from the day of their birth. 
Bates was well aware that Little Rock represented yet 
another event in a long history of racial discrimination 
in the United States. This study, hopefully, is an 
addition to that understanding, as the author explores how 
American racism was deployed in the desegregation process 
in Little Rock, Arkansas. 
Another book, not a first person account, is Irving 
Spitzberg, Jr.'s Racial Politics in Little Rock, 1954 1964. 
Spitzberg was a high school student in Little Rock in the 
years 1957 through 1959. His is a sociological study of 
local politics in Little Rock during the decade between 
1954 and 1964. Like Bates, he placed most of the blame for 
the political crisis upon those on the local level, 
especially the school board and local white civic leaders. 
His conclusion, 
insofar as . the Blossom plan failed, it failed 
because the superintendent did not organize the 
local polity in a manner to ensure commitment to 
public education when the choice came between them. 
One can trace directly the community leadership's 
complete inaction in the face of this political 
5 
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intru~i?n tp 1the Blossom method of preparing for the trans1t1on. 
Although in the book's preface, Spitzberg acknowledged, "I 
am about to tell a story with no heroes and no villains," 
his whole argument hinged upon the conclusion that 
Blossom's one-man show strategy for desegregation 
effectively silenced white civic leaders, who customarily 
were active politically. ~ greater part of the study was 
devoted to how the white leadership acted in the aftermath 
of Faubus' s September 1957 actions, once they hurt these 
leaders financially and socially. 12 
In this author's opinion, there are two major 
weaknesses in Spitzberg's study. First is the complete 
lack of analysis of white-black relations in Little Rock 
during these years. Consequently, this read as a study of 
how whites in Little Rock were affected by Faubus's 
actions. The second weakness is directly related to his 
methodology. Spitzberg relied heavily on personal 
interviews, 41 in all (of which seven were with African 
Americans). Yet, none of the comments of those 
interviewed were identified in the text. Instead, he 
anonymously listed their comments as "Confidential Source" 
13 followed by a number. 
Other scholarly works also have followed this same 
pattern of focusing on white policy makers at the expense 
of African Americans who were also shaping events. In his 
1973 doctoral dissertation, "Civil Rights Policies in the 
Eisenhower Years," Ronald Schlundt succinctly placed his 
6 
-- - -
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argument within this narrow framework. In Chapter 5: "The 
Justice Department and the White House--I: Desegregation 
of Schools and the Little Rock Crisis," Schlundt 
chronicled the political maneuvering of local, state, and 
federal authorities that ultimately led to the showdown 
between Faubus and Eisenhower. He concluded that 
during the Little Rock crisis, the White House and 
Justice Department intervened only when prodded and 
tried to avoid making decisions when asked. As a 
result of the continuation of this hands-off policy, 
the forces of obstruction in Arkansas became 
convinced that the administration would take no 
action, until a strong responp~ from Washington 
became virtually unavoidable. 
Again, the operating assumption was that if Faubus had not 
intervened or if the federal government had taken on more 
responsibility after the Brown decision, the Little Rock 
school system would have been desegregated peacefully. 
In framing the Little Rock situation principally as 
a political or a constitutional crisis, scholars have 
limited too much the boundaries of analysis. Writers have 
focused on white policy makers at the expense of other 
participants --chiefly African Americans. Too often 
scholars forget to analyze the nature of desegregation that 
whites were defending. My argument is built on the 
assumption that the Little Rock crisis was first and 
foremost a crisis in white-black paternalistic race 
relations. Initiated by African Americans who stepped 
outside of the normative channeling of minority grievances 
--bi-racial meetings-- blacks in Little Rock not only 
caused a crisis in race relations, but also created a 
7 
crisis within the white community, and another among the 
local, state, and national political structures. Thus 
without the continual pressing for full citizenship on the 
part of blacks, what little that was achieved during the 
political crisis of 1957 in Little Rock could not have 
been realized. 
This thesis is an attempt to highlight the actions 
of African Americans alongside those of whites in the 
history of desegregation, during the years from 1954 to 
1958. Section I of the essay focuses on Brown v. Board of 
Education and .the power that the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) possessed in the 
federal courts. For the status of the NAACP as the leader 
in the fight for more equal educational opportunities for 
black children directly relates to the limited options 
those on the local level held for carrying out the court's 
decisions. The fight for an equal public education is 
also discussed in the context of the larger national white 
discourse. In effect, how did the nation respond to the 
challenge of the Brown decision to the racial status quo. 
Section II, the greater portion of the paper, 
focuses specifically on race relations in Little Rock. It 
considers the formulation of the Blossom plan, the nature 
of white-formulated desegregation, its consequences for 
Little Rock's blacks, and how the African American 
community responded. In essence, section II is an 
8 
analysis of the power dynamics of race relations in Little 
Rock which undermined black expectations of achieving equal 
educational opportunities "with all deliberate speed." 
9 
SECTION I 
Brown v. Board of Education, 1954-1956 
If ever there was a time when we must be patient 
without being complacent, when we must be 
understanding of other people's deep emotions as 
well as our own, this is it. Extremists on neither 
side are going to help this situation, and we can 
only believe that the good sense, the common sense, 
of Americans will bring this thing along. 
President Eisenhower, 15 March 1956 15 
I'm the world's oldest gradualist ••• I just think 
ninety-odd years is gradual enough. 
Thurgood Marshall, 14 May 1958 16 
In 1952 as the NAACP moved forward on appeal in a 
series of cases challenging the constitutionality of de 
jure segregated education systems, the Supreme Court was 
re-examining the constitutionality of its earlier decision 
in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), which first articulated the 
"separate but equal" doctrine. The Court ruled in 1896 
that state laws [in this particular case, of Louisiana] 
requiring the separation of the races in public 
accommodations were not a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and were thus constitutional so long as "such 
10 
../ 
laws as [were] enacted in good faith for the promotion of 
the public good, and not for the annoyance or oppression 
of a particular class." The NAACP cases of 1952 
challenged both the unequal separate school systems and 
the intellectual rationale underlying a paternalistic 
system of southern race relations. The Supreme Court 
case, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, involved a 
series of four individual cases concerning similar 
constitutional questions. The Brown case was part of an 
all out attack on Jim Crow that the NAACP began in the 
years leading up to World War II and which it accelerat~d 
after the war. 17 
The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Fred Vinson 
(1946-1953) responded slowly to the NAACP's challenges. 
Although only six cases concerning the separate but equal 
doctrine in secondary education had ever been heard on the 
Supreme Court level, none directly challenged Plessy. The 
Court consistently adopted the narrowest possible reading. 
It wo~ld rule in favor of the plaintiff, but cite 
extenuating circumstances of a particular plaintiff or 
situation. The Court continued dancing around Plessy, 
refusing to address the constitutionality of the separate 
but equal doctrine, until the NAACP mounted a campaign to 
force direct consideration of Plessy and, hopefully, to 
end discrimination in public education. The NAACP first 
focused on the graduate school level; after gaining a 
_ ___,-,,,.,,,- series of victories there, they turned to the secondary 
11 
18 
schools. 
The Supreme Court initially skirted the central 
constitutional questions involved in segregated school 
cases. In Sweatt v. Painter (1950), the Court ruled in 
favor of the plaintiff, Heman Marion Sweatt, an applicant 
to the University of Texas Law School. It ruled that 
although the state of Texas provided its African-American 
citizens a segregated law school, it was inherently 
unequal not only because of the absence of quality 
faculty, facilities, and until Sweatt applied, a student 
body, but also because the black law school 
exclude[d] from its student body 85% of the 
population of the State including most of the 
lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges, and other 
officials with whom the petitioner would inevitably 
be df~ling when he becomes a member of the Texas 
Bar. 
The Court's reasoning came down on the side of Mr. Sweatt, 
but not on the side of all African-Americans who desired 
equal educational opportunities. The Court granted Sweatt 
injunctive relief, ordering state officials to admit him 
to the University of Texas law school. Al though .the NAACP 
won the case, those states with segregated educational 
facilities were able to maintain them. 
In another case filed by the NAACP i .n 1950, 
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, the Court also found 
for the plaintiff. In this instance, Mr. McLaurin had 
already been admitted to a doctorate program at the 
previously all-white state university, but he was then 
segregated from his fellow students in the library, 
12 
classrooms, and in social areas. The importance of this 
case lies in the Court's rejection of the state's argument 
that by tradition Oklahoma citizens segregated themselves 
and that the regents' actions were dictated by their 
concerns that if integrated, Mr. McLaurin would be 
ostracized by his peers. Chief Justice Vinson in his 
decision explained to Oklahoma the difference between state 
imposed restrictions and those individuals impose on 
themselves: "There is a vast difference --a Constitutional 
difference-- between restrictions imposed by the state 
[and] the refusal of individuals to commingle." Although 
these cases did set precedents which were later expanded in 
the Brown decision, they were still narrowly focused from 
the NAACP's perspective to affect the larger structure of 
southern education. The NAACP wanted an end to school 
segregation throughout the United States. Those states 
with segregated educational facilities were able to 
·maintain them. Until the Brown case reached the Supreme 
Court, each suit was brought on behalf of a single 
individual, addressing a specific failure of the Plessy 
doctrine. Thurgood Marshall and his team of NAACP lawyers 
were slowly chipping away at "separate but equal." But 
not until Brown was the Supreme Court forced to address 
the constitutional issues of the "separate but equal" 
doctrine in the area of segregated public schools on the 
secondary levei. 20 
13 
Following original arguments in Brown in December 
of 1952, the Supreme Court had further questions for the 
parties to the litigation. Prodded by Associate Justice 
Felix Frankfurter who was seeking a unanimous decision in 
the case, on 8 June 1953, "all five segregation cases [in 
Brown] were unanimously restored to the docket for 
reargument on October 12." This date was moved to 
December of 1953 after the unexpected death of Chief 
Justice Fred Vinson in September. The Supreme Court, 
under the leadership of newly appointed Chief Justice Earl 
Warren, was ready to tackle Plessy in 1954. It did so 
·beginning in December of 1953 in the reargument of Brown. 
On May 17, 1954, Chief Justice Warren announced the 
unanimous decision declaring segregated public schools 
unconstitutional: 
We conclude that in the field of public education 
the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no place. 
Separate educational facilities are inherently 
unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs and 
others similarly situated for who the actions have 
been brought are, by reason of the segregation 
complained of, deprived of the equal protection 9t 
the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.-
Unlike the previous NAACP lawsuits, Brown was a class-
action suit on behalf of all African Americans attending 
segregated public schools. Thus the Court's decision was 
directed at all de jure segregated school systems in the 
United States, not simply those of the parties named in 
the individual suits. Hence the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) prevailed in the 
landmark case, Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 
14 
Kansas, after a long and arduous struggle that began well 
before World War II, against a southern system of de jure 
racially segregated public schools. 22 
The new legal theory initially had little effect on 
the southern practice of de jure school segregation. 
In the fall of 1961, only 7.3% of all black students 
in the South (including the District of Columbia, 
Delaware, West Virginia, and Missouri) went to 
schools attended by whites. In three Southern 
states not a single black student attended a 
desegregated school, 2~nd in seven others less than 
one per cent did so. 
These findings also apply to school segregation in Little 
Rock, Arkansas. As late as the 1961-1962 school year, only 
45 black students of a total student population of 21,569 
were permitted to attend previously all-white junior and 
senior high schools. In the 1962-1963 school year, 
elementary schools in Little Rock were still strictly 
segregated. Racial segregation in public schools 
throughout the South remained the model during the 1950's 
and into the 1960's. 24 
25 In Brown I , the Supreme Court sided with the 
NAACP and recognized that even though segregated school 
systems may at times appear en facie equal, the courts must 
go beyond an examination of mere "tangible" factors and 
look at the effects of such systems: 
Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a 
comparison of these tangible factors in the Negro 
and white schools ••• We must look instead to the 26 
effect of segregation itself on public education. 
The Chief Justice cited the psychologically damaging impact 
segregation had on black children: 
15 
To separate them from others of similar age and 
qualifications solely because of their race 
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their 
status in the community that may affect thei 27hearts 
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be done. 
After achieving victory over southern segregationists, the 
NAACP nevertheless still faced tremendous obstacles in 
effecting the implementation of Brown. 
The implementation ruling of Brown, known as 
Brown II, demonstrated the limitations of the NAACP's legal 
strategy. On May 31, 1955, the last day of the court 
term, the Supreme Court delivered the implementation 
decision of Brown. Recognizing that education is "perhaps 
the most important function of state and local 
governments," the Supreme Court in Brown II entrusted 
these political units with sole responsibility for 
implementing the Court's decrees. In Brown I, the Court 
recognized that public education was a state and local 
responsibility. Accordingly, it placed the responsibility 
of desegregation on these officials. Chief Justice Earl 
Warren wrote for the Court, 
school authorities have the primary responsibility 
for elucidating, accessing, and solving these 
problems; courts will have to consider whether the 
action of school authorities constitutes good faith 
im~le~entati~n of governing constitutional 
pr 1nc1ples. 
The Court's decision was problematic for the NAACP and 
African Americans because it did not recognize the near 
absence of political power of blacks on the state and 
local levels of governance in South. In a city like 
Little Rock, Arkansas, where the black population was one-
16 
fourth the size of the white population, sheer numbers of 
white voters precluded the notion that blacks would be on 
local school boards. Hence, it was highly doubtful that 
they could determine their own destiny alongside these 
white majorities. Unlike in Brown I, where they 
successfully challenged racial segregation --a system of 
white dominance over African Americans-- the NAACP and 
African Americans were shut out of the process of public 
school reconstruction in Brown II and on the local levels 
29 
of southern government. 
Marshall and his team of NAACP lawyers representing 
not just the plaintiffs involved in the particular cases, 
but all black Americans, wanted a total and immediate 
integration of public schools. Kluger in Simple Justice 
summarized the NAACP's opposition to gradual integration 
during the implementation arguments: 
Thurgood Marshall closed out the argument for black 
America. He insisted that 'there is nothing before 
this Court that can show any justification for 
giving this interminable gradual adjustment • . I am 
particularly shocked at arguments of impotency of 
our government to enforce its Constitution.' ••• Why 
should those seeking to delay desegregation 'be 
given advanta~ 0 brought out by their own 
wrongdoing. '? 
However, the NAACP lawyers recognized the political and 
legal infeasibility of such a strategy in the face of 
southern intransigence. So they argued for integration 
with a specific tbnetable. As Richard Kluger emphasized 
in Simple Justice, 
17 
the South was devoting its efforts to circumventing 
the decision, not to figure out how best and 
faithfully to bow to it. For that reason, it was 
vital that the Court set a fixed 3qate for the end of 
segregated schools everywhere ••• 
In his closing arguments in Brown II, Marshall reiterated 
the NAACP position that if the South is not given a set 
date to complete the integration of schools, the Brown 
decision "will mean nothing [to black Americans] until the 
time limit is set." In the Brown II decision glaringly 
absent were the words 'desegregation' and 'integration'. 
The court, instead, posited its opinion in a more inclusive 
rhetoric of ridding public education of racial 
discrimination. Even so, the Brown II decision in many 
ways aided those who wanted to preserve and fortify 
segregation, not end it. 32 
Without giving a specific timetable as the NAACP 
wanted, or detailed instructions to the lower courts, 
Warren laid a grid of legal expectations • 
••• the courts will require that the defendants make 
a prompt and reasonable start 3~ward full compliance 
with our May 17, 1954, ruling. 
Expecting local units to submit plans to the lower courts 
for approval, warren continued, 
they will also consider the adequacy of any plans 
the defendants may propose to meet these problems 
and to effectuate a transition tj 4a racially 
nondiscriminatory school system. 
The eight paragraph decision ended with "all deliberate 
speed"~ an innocuous enough phrase which would mean very 
different things for the majority of southern whites and 
African Americans. 
18 
The Court reached its decision only through a well 
organized legal campaign begun by the NAACP some twenty 
years earlier. These legal achievements were won in the 
face of southern state intransigence. The Court's 
implementation decision handed down on May 31, 1955, 
however, gave African-Americans an uneasy feeling. In the 
implementation phase of Brown II, the Court also provided 
a decentralized framework in which school desegregation 
would be achieved. 
Full implementation of these constitutional 
principles may require solution of varied local 
school problems. School authorities have the 
primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, 
and solving these problems; courts will have to 
consider whether the action of school authorities 
constitutes good faith implementation of the 
governing constitutional principles. Because of 
their proximity to local conditions and the possible 
need for further hearings, the courts which 
originally heard these cases can best perform this 
judicia~ appraisal. Accordingly, we believe it 35 
appropriate to remand the cases to those courts. 
Unlike the celebrations that followed Brown I, the 
NAACP quickly realized the Court's refusal to set a 
specific timetable for desegregation --regardless of 
local conditions-- would only allow recalcitrant school 
districts to ignore indefinitely the order. The Court's 
Brown II decision has thus led one historian to conclude 
that "by almost any measure, [Brown II] gave the South a 
great deal more of what it had asked at the final round of 
arguments than it gave the Negro." The nine Justic~s of 
the Supreme Court were depending on the prestige of the 
entire Federal Judiciary, responsible state and local 
19 
officials, and if necessary, the moral and constitutional 
authority of the entire Federal Government. The Court 
soon realized that not only had it been the final arbiter 
on a great constitutional and moral issue, but that it 
would stand alone among the three branches of the Federal 
Government in ensuring the implementation of Brown. 36 
Why, after almost ten years since declaring 
segregated public school systems unconstitutional, were the 
overwhelming majority of black students in the South in 
1963 still attending often inferior, segregated schools? 
The answer lay partly in the different positions of the 
NAACP in the federal courts versus African Americans on the 
local levels of government in southern states. As subjects 
in the legal process, African Americans appropriated the 
dominant ideological rhetoric of liberty and equality in 
their argument against school segregation. In Brown, they 
especially were able to expose the weaknesses and 
inconsistencies of the Plessy doctrine on which the 
southern system of white supremacy was dependent for its 
legal and political legiti..rnacy. Throughout the legal 
process, Thurgood Marshall et al. exposed the inconsistency 
of white reasoning. They effectively weakened white 
arguments that both whites and blacks desired segregation 
and that separate facilities were equal. The NAACP 
disrobed white rhetoric that claimed the two races were 
actually separated under de jure segregation. In the 
original case of Brown v. Board of Education, legal counsel 
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for black elementary school children pointed to the 
inconsistencies of the Kansas state law permitting (but not 
requiring) cities with a population of 15,000 or more to 
operate schools on a segregated basis. In Topeka, the 
state's capital, only the elementary schools were racially 
segregated; all other schools were operated on a non-
a b . 3 7 segregate asis. 
This legal strategy was buttressed by the NAACP's 
use of sociological and psychological data, which 
demolished the constitutional reasoning of Plessy v. 
Ferguson (1896). Associate Supreme Court Justice Henry 
Billings Brown, writing in the 1896 Plessy decision, 
outlined the Court's disingenuous response to Homer Adolph 
Plessy's argument that racial segregation [on railroad 
cars] was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
We consider the underlying fallacy of the 
plaintiff's argument to consist in the assumption 
that the enforced separation of the two races stamps 
the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If 
this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in 
the act, but solely b:cause th~ Cjeored race chooses 
to put that construction upon it. 
NAACP chief counsel, Thurgood Marshall, and his team of 
lawyers skillfully introduced into the Brown cases 
evidence to the contrary. Relying to a great extent on 
the doll experiments of psychologists Kenneth and Mamie 
Clarke, they argued that racial segregation was injurious 
to black children. 39 The Court agreed. 
The NAACP's power, howeve r , remained a 'negating' 
one as demonstrated in the Supreme Court desegregation 
21 
implementation orders. On the federal level, this limited 
power enabled blacks to get specific racist practices 
declared unconstitutional; African Americans were active 
participants in the courts, able to act as subjects 
affecting change rather than being objects of change. 
They, however, could not achieve positive or reconstructive 
changes endorsed by the Supreme Court. This was 
demonstrated in Brown II when the Supreme Court summarily 
rejected NAACP strategies and accepted those of the 
Eisenhower Justice Department: no timetable and gradual 
desegregation under the jurisdiction of the District 
courts. According to Kluger, the Supreme Court not only 
accepted in full the Justice Department's amicus curiae 
brief, but also it integrated the following remarks by 
President Eisenhower included in the government's brief, 
regarding how the Brown decision would affect southern 
whites: 
--an institution, it may be noted, which during 
its existence not only has had the sanction of 
decisions of this Court but has been fervently 
supported by great numbers of people as justifiable 
on legal and moral grounds. The Court's holding in 
the present cases that segregation is a denial of 
constitutional rights involved an express recognition 
of the importance of psychological and emotional 
factors; the impact of segregation upon children, 
the Court found, can so affect their lives as to 
preclude their full enjoyment of constitutional 
rights. In sLmilar fashion, psychological and 
emotional factors are involved--and must be met with 
understanding and good will--in the alterations that 
must now take place in order to bring 4 ebout 
compliance with the Court's decision. 
Whereas the Brown decision was directed against a 
segregation system designed by whites, President 
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Eisenhower's concern was for those southern whites who 
would be affected by Brown. His central concern was not 
for those southern black taxpayers and black American 
citizens, and their children who were receiving inferior 
educations for at least 50 years. Thus, the inclusion of 
his remarks are even more ironic when one considers the 
overwhelming economic, social, and political power whites 
held over blacks not only in southern states, but 
h h h . d 41 t roug out t e Unite States. 
At the local levels the position of African 
Americans was reversed --now African Americans were the 
objects of desegregation plans as they were earlier in 
segregation laws-- as southern school boards attempted to 
obey the "law of the land" by devising desegregation plans 
that could pass constitutional muster. Having no power of 
enforcement, the Supreme Court looked to other branches of 
government for the orderly carrying out of its decisions, 
including the Brown decision. Unfortunately, for African 
Americans, local school boards in the South were usually 
dominated by hostile whites, and they (blacks) had no 
direct representation on these boards. In places like 
Little Rock, Arkansas, black Americans were not direct 
participants in reconstructing more equal public school 
systems. They could challenge white-devi _sed plans that 
promised only a bare minimum of school desegregation, but 
they could not construct alternative ones. 
While African Americans and supportive whites were 
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attempting to redefine American race relations via the 
courts, southern defenders of the racial status quo in 
Congress and in the states were fighting back, as northern 
whites would do two decades later. Senator Eastland of 
Mississippi took to the senate floor less than a week 
after the Brown I decision to defend 'our southern way of 
living'. He attacked the Court for what he viewed as its 
utter disregard for the constitution and warned all white 
southerners of the clear and present danger of these 
rulings. 
The Court has determined to strike down all State 
laws which provide for racial segregation, and upon 
which the institutions, the culture, and the 
civilization of the South are built. This attack 
upon the South is ni 2 concluded. We are witnessing 
only the beginning. 
As the spokesperson for a southern (white) civilization, 
he further outlined the ideology that lay behind racial 
segregation. 
The future greatness of America depends upon racial 
purity [of the white race] and the maintenance of 
Anglo-Saxon institutions, 4~hich still flourish in full flower in the South. 
Hence, segregation was necessary for the purity of the 
Anglo-Saxon race and for the strength of American 
institutions. Unlike the NAACP and other black Americans 
who were demanding equal access to public education, 
Eastland was reiterating the worn-out argument that both 
races desired de jure segregation: 
Segregation is not a badge of racial inferiority, 
and that it is not is recognized by both races in 
the Southern States. In fact, segregation is 
desired and supported by the vast majority of the 
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members of both of the races in the south who dwell 
side by side under harmonious ~~nditions ••• There is 
no racial hatred in the South. 
Instead, Eastland explained, southern whites have "race 
consciousness'. 
Had they not possessed it, the South would have been 
mong 45lized and southern civilization destroyed long 
ago. 
For Eastland and many white southerners, 'southern' 
civilization was code for 'white' society. By this 
definition, no black American could be a full citizen. 46 
Unwilling to recognize that some black Americans 
did not accept the second class citizenship to which 
southern ideology relegated them, Eastland saw a communist 
conspiracy infiltrating the chambers of the United States 
Supreme Court. He claimed that the Court had "been 
indoctrinated and brainwashed by left-wing pressure 
groups." Citing individual justices being "honored by 
left-wing Communist-front organizations militantly 
interested in legislation on which the Supreme Court must 
pass," he condemned the Brown I ruling as a 
violation of the Constitution, the laws of nature, 
and the laws of God ••• an attempt to put the races 
together, physically, upon a plane of social 
equality ••• [that] will justly cause, in my opinion, 
evasion and violation of law and con 4,mpt for law, 
and will do this country great harm. 
In considering the impact that Brown and other rulings 
banning segregation in publicly-owned facilities would 
have on southern institutions, Eastland concluded that 
These decisions, coming at a time of grave world 
crisis, when there should be unity in the United 
States, will cause great dissension and will weaken 
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. 11 48 us interna y. 
Eastland's kind of 'unity' however was built on a 
variety of assumptions on the proper position of blacks 
including their subordination to white authority-- in the 
American polity. Thus the southern way of life was not 
simply a separation of the two races, denoting a 'social 
superiority' of the white race, it was the embodiment of 
white civilization at the expense of black Americans' full 
citizenship. Because southern whites viewed blacks as 
passive and as social inferiors, Eastland could easily 
shift the focus of debate from the power dynamics of race 
relations to blaming outside meddlers for the Court's 
attacks on southern segregation. 
Everyone knows that the Negroes did not themselves 
instigate the agitation against segregation. They 
~ere put up to it by :adical ~usyb~die~ wh~ are 49 intent upon overthrowing American inst1tut1ons. 
According to southern white ideology, African Americans 
could not have demanded equality for they too understood 
that they were not yet ready for full citizenship. For 
those few who did not know, white spokesmen like Senator 
Eastland would speak on their behalf. 
Eastland then proposed an amendment to the 
constitution to safeguard against federal meddling in 
state affairs. The unsuccessful proposal read: 
There shall be no interference with or 
limitation upon the power of any State to regulate 
health, morals, education, marriage, and good order 
in the State; and exclu~6ve jurisdiction thereof is 
reserved to the States. 
In the meantL~e, Eastland called upon all southern [white] 
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people to present a united front to insure the continuance 
of their segregated school system. And that they did 
immediately following the 1956 decision of the Supreme 
Court. 
By that date when the implementation ruling of the 
Brown decision was announced, seven southern states were 
well on their way in thwarting school desegregation. As 
of January 1956, Virginia and Louisiana amended their 
state constitutions, allowing state funds for pupils 
attending private, segregated schools. Three more states 
passed interposition laws, declaring that the Supreme 
Court encroached upon states' rights in its Brown 
decision; while Florida authorized the formation of a 
state commission whose duty it was "to seek all legal 
f "d" d . n51 means o avo1 1ng esegregat1on. 
Southern obstructionists got further support from 
approximately one-hundred southern delegates to Congress 
who signed the Southern Manifesto of March 1956. As 
Eastland did one year earlier, the Strom Thurmond-inspired 
manifesto derided the Supreme Court for 
destroying the amicable relations that have been 
created through 90 years of patient effort by the 
good people of both races. It has planted hatred 
and suspicion where there has 5~een heretofore friendship and understanding. 
The signers also lent direct support to southern states 
attempting to r-esist desegregation by commending "the 
motives of those states which have declared the intention 
to resist forced integration by any lawful means." The 
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Southern Manifesto was a diplomatic call to arms which 
f th d th h . . 53 ur er encourage sou ern w ite resistance. 
After Senator Walter F. George of Georgia read the 
document, Strom Thurmond of South Carolina took to the 
senate floor to discuss what had always been lurking 
behind southern rhetoric: southern whites were the true 
victims and the greatest minority in the nation. 
All of us have heard a great deal of talk about the 
persecution of minority groups. The white people of 
the South are the greatest minority in this Nation. 
They deserve consideration and understand!ig instead 
of the persecution of twisted propaganda. 
Major Federick Sullens, editor of the Jackson Daily News 
in Mississippi, earlier presented a similar view that 
white southerners were the true victims. He also claimed, 
as many southern whites did, that "the tragic part of this 
unwarranted decision is that the thinking people of 
. h h b d f · n 55 neit er race want tea an onment o segregation. 
Others in the Senate, however, rose to challenge 
this perversion of reasoning. Senator Morse of Oregon was 
the most forceful in his condemnation of the signers of the 
Southern Manifesto and the most articulate in his support 
of Brown. He assailed the signers, 
If the gentlemen from the South really want to take 
such action, let the..m propose a constitutional 
amendment that will deny to the colored people of 
the country equality of rights under the 
cons~itution, ang 6see how far they will get with the American people. 
Echoing the sentLments of Thurgood Marshall and many 
African Americans, he too was tired of southern white 
smokescreens for denying African Americans equality of 
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justice. 
I say, respectfully, the South has had all the time 
since the War Between the States to make this 
adjustment. That is why I am not greatly moved by 
these last-hour pleas of the South, "We need more 
time, more time, more time." How much more time is 
needed in order that equality of justice may be 
appl~ed S9 the blacks as well as to the whites in 
America? 
Senator Morse concluded, the Supreme Court "has at long 
last declared that all Americans are equal, and that the 
flame of justice in America must burn as brightly in the 
homes of the blacks as in the homes of the whites." 58 
Not letting southerners monopolize cold war 
rhetoric, two northerners, urban Senators Richard Neuberger 
and Hubert Humphrey cited southern intransigence as a 
factor that could lead to a loss of American leadership 
abroad. Senator Humphrey explicitly made the connection 
between justice and internal stability as necessary 
ingredients in claiming world leadership: 
If America ever hopes to give world leadership, 
we must set the pattern here in America. We have to 
set it unmistakably in a firm belief in humane 
equality and equal justice under the law. 
This is the very heart and core of an effective 
foreign policy ••• No amount of appropriations, no 
amount of armaments, can be as important today as 
being right and being moral and being just. 
Citizenship in America must be first-class 
c~t~zensh~p. 59 There can be no second-class 
c1t1zensh1p. 
Continuing the remarks of Senator Humphrey, Neuberger 
directly challenged southern racial ideology and the 
accusation that these lawsuits were instigated by 
'communist-front organizations intent on overthrowing the 
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government.' 
We live in a world most of whose people are of a 
different color than white. What are they thinking 
when members of the highest American parliamentary 
body announce themselves as against judicial 
decisions granting equality to colored people in 
America? How fares the Soviet Unigfl propaganda war 
as a result of these developments? 
Hence, from the moment the Supreme Court announced its 
initial decision of Brown in May 1954, white southern 
leaders worked toward reinforcing the racial status quo of 
the South and the racial segregation on which they were 
dependent. The one individual on the federal level who 
could have used his leadership and moral position to 
affect positively post-Brown events initially failed to do 
so. When President Eisenhower did act, his response was 
too little, too late to affect a smooth transition. 
The president had many opportunities to take a 
stand between May 1954 and September 1957. Previous to 
Brown twenty-one states and the District of Columbia either 
legally required or permitted racial segregation in public 
schools. By the end of 1956, ten of these states and the 
District were either desegregated or on their way to 
achieving desegregation. It was the states of the Old 
Confederacy that were maintaining Plessy. In these 
situations the president had an opportunity to demonstrate 
his support for equality in public education, and yet he 
refused. Virginia, Georgia, Louisiana, South Carolina, 
Mississippi, and Florida all passed laws by 1957 that 
effectively nullified court ordered desegregation and yet 
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Eisenhower and the Justice Department, denying they had 
the constitutional authority, refused to intervene in 
school desegregation cases. As late as 11 September 1956, 
Eisenhower insisted that the executive was impotent. 
Speaking with Attorney General Brownell, "The President 
said the whole U.S. thinks the President has a right to 
walk in and say 'disperse -- we are going to have negroes 
in the high schools and so on.' That is not so.n 61 
The White House officially remained silent on the 
issue of school desegregation until March 1956 when over 
one-hundred southern Congressmen and Senators signed the 
"Southern Manifesto". These Senators and Representatives 
aided southern attempts at undermining the Brown decision 
as they "promised to use all lawful means to maintain 
segregation." Rather than reminding the southern 
"gentlemen" of their responsibilities to uphold the United 
States Constitution, Eisenhower narrowly focused on the 
inconsequential fact that the legislators were not calling 
for nullification: 
the first thing about the manifesto ••• is this: Thg 2 they say they are going to use every legal means. 
The President maintained a seemingly neutral position 
h . h h . . 63 w 1c could only encourage sout ern 1ntrans1gence. 
When particular southern states began to flaunt 
publicly their determination not to desegregate their 
schools, Eisenhower, simply changed the reasoning behind 
his inaction rather than provide any real leadership. The 
Eisenhower administration contended it lacked the 
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constitutional authority to intervene (unless specifically 
requested by the state or local authorities) and that 
federal action was unnecessary so long as the individual 
states maintained order. Hence, school segregation became 
not a moral or constitutional issue, but one of law and 
. 64 
order. 
An opportunity arose in 1956 for Eisenhower to act 
in a well publici .zed Texas case. In September of 1956, 
under a court order to desegregate schools in the city of 
Mansfield, a few African-American students attempted to 
enroll at all-white Mansfield High School. The day they 
arrived at the school, the mayor of Mansfield and its 
chief of police were conspicuously out of town. A white 
mob formed at the high school thus preventing the students 
from actually enrolling. Then, Governor Allan Shivers 
ordered the Texas Rangers on the scene, giving them the 
authority to arrest "anyone who represented a threat to the 
peace." The students were promptly arrested. The Governor 
not only sided with the mob, but he also publicly nullified 
specific Federal Court orders to allow the black students 
to enroll. "Yet through the entire incident, the Justice 
Department ignored a NAACP request for federal intervention 
in Mansfield to protect the rights of the black students 
there." 65 
When Eisenhower was asked during a press conference 
on 5 September 1956 whether his administration or the 
Justice Depar~ment were planning to take action against 
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Texas officials, Eisenhower replied that law and order had 
been restored and therefore, the issue was moot. He then 
went further 
I want to emphasize this: certainly, every liberal 
will be very jealous of protecting the locality's 
right to execute the police power in this country. 
When police power is executed habitually by 
the ••• Federal Government, we are in a bad way. So, 
until the states show their inability or their 
refusal to grapple with this question properly which 
they haven't yet, at least as any proof has been 
submitted, we'd better be very ggreful about moving 
in and exercising police power. 
Eisenhower failed to mention, however, that the re-
establishment of law and order denied African-Americans in 
Mansfield, Texas their constitutional rights to an equal 
educational system. 
In his study "Civil Rights Policies in the 
Eisenhower Years", Ronald Schlundt traced the President's 
reluctance to intervene in Texas as a political move. 
Schlundt argued that Eisenhower understood "the importance 
of Texas in the corning presidential election" in deciding 
not to intervene. Regardless of motive in this particular 
case, Eisenhower sent a signal to the Old Confederacy that 
whether or not integration proceeded "with all deliberate 
speed" was immaterial, the Federal Government would not 
intervene so long as authorities maintained a superficial 
sense of order. The President's refusal to put forth the 
full moral and political force of his office remained 
consistent from the initial Brown decision right up until 
1957, when the Federal Government was forced to intervene 
--not to enforce desegregation, but to restore law and 
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order in Little Rock. As late as 3 September 1957, the 
day on which Faubus ordered the Arkansas National Guard to 
prevent black students from entering Central High in 
defiance of court orders, Eisenhower remained steadfast in 
his refusal to lend any moral support behind Brown: 
Now, time and again, a number of people --r, among 
them-- have argued that you cannot change people's 
hearts merely by laws. Laws are presumably --express 
the conscience of a nation and its determination or 
will-- to do something. But the laws here are to be 
executed gradually, according to the Supreme 
Court ••• Now there seems to have been a road block 
thrown in the way ••• and the next g~cision will have 
to be by the lawyers and jurists. 
This lack of leadership, coupled with the congressional 
defiance of the Brown decision, would have severe 
consequences in places like Little Rock, Arkansas, where 
local school boards were searching for leadership in 
h 1 d .. d d . . 68 s arp y 1v1 e commun1 ties. 
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SECTION II 
Little Rock, Arkansas, 1954-1964 
I hated the people who had apparently burned 
the Constitution of the United States when they 
placed fiery crosses on 'the lawn of our home; I 
hated the so-called liberals who were too afraid of 
their social positions to speak out clearly and 
firmly; I hated the moderates who were too cowardly 
to say: "This is the law of the land, and it must be 
obeyed. This kind of action should not only be 
stopped in Little Rock, but throughout the nation." 
Most of all I hated the frightened and complacent 
Negro of the south, and the contented Negro of the 
North and East. 
Daisy Bates, 2 May 195a 69 
On the evening of 23 September 1957, an anonymous 
telephone caller to the home of Daisy Bates announced: "We 
have just had our first killing in Little Rock, and you 
are responsible. There will be more before day." Bates 
immediately assumed that the segregationist mob which had 
forced the "Little Rock nine" to withdraw from Central 
High earlier in the day had lynched the father of one of 
the black students on his return from a night job. 
Although the report shortly thereafter was proven false, 
Bates could no longer contain her anger, frustration, and 
even rage over the active and passive resistance of whites 
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in Little Rock against the struggle of African Americans 
to achieve equality. At that moment and in her 
reflections, she weighed the heretofore passive behavior 
of southern blacks: 
In that moment I became bitter for the first time. 
I wondered who was to blame for this day and night 
of horror. I hated in that moment Faubus, the White 
Citizens Council, and all of its kind. But 
some thing seemed to say, "No,- Daisy, they a re not to 
blame. You are responsible, along with all the 
freedom-loving people of America. You are 
responsible because you didn't holler loud enough 
when [that] policeman on the corner beat up the 
"Wine-O:" when you failed to register and vote you 
were aiding and abetting the Faubuses all over the 
south. The sororities, fraternities, the 
professional group who failed to feel the plight of 
the little Negro when he was mistreated, denied, and 
harassed: yes - all of us share in this 
responsibfoity of September 23, 1957, in Little Rock, 
Arkansas. 
Bates, who lived in Arkansas all her life, was feeling the 
effects of white repression: a repression that descended 
upon those who dared to step outside of the confines of 
bl . h d f 1 . . 1 · 71 esta is e patterns o paterna 1st1c race re ations. 
Bi-racial interactions in Little Rock although 
frequent, were far from equal. For many white participants 
the objective of these meetings was to maintain racial 
harmony, not to achieve equal justice. This became most 
apparent when during the events of 1957-1958 white 
participants continually stressed the importance of law and 
order and racial harmony above black equality. With the 
exception of Ogdon Dunbar, Jr., a local Presbyterian 
minister, no other white individual was as consistent in 
public support of Little Rock's black community. When the 
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clergy did respond belatedly, they did so in the grand 
tradition of southern white paternalism. In the midst of 
chaos, they called for prayer services to be held on 12 
October 1957. However, "white ministers determined the 
call, formulated the objects of petition, and then invited 
Negroes to cooperate." Their objective was a "calling for 
the observance of law and order and good will among men." 
In the hearts and minds of these white ministers, the 
overriding concern was racial harmony and community order, 
not black oppression: "the 'churchmen do not pl an to take 
·a . h n72 s1 es 1n t e matter. 
For those individuals, black and white, who dared 
to take the side of equality, stepping outside the 
established racial status quo brought severe sanctions. 
Bates and her husband suffered heavily. Bates, who grew 
up in the small southern Arkansas town of Huttig, was 
raised by family friends, Orlee and Susie Gatson, after 
her mother was attacked and killed by three white men 
early in Daisy's childhood. Following her marriage circa 
1941 to Lucius Christopher Bates, Bates and her husband 
moved to Little Rock. It was there that the Bates founded 
the Arkansas State Press, "a crusading paper for Negro 
rights." Bates was co-publisher and manager, while L.C. 
was editor. As early as 1956, when as president of the 
local NAACP Bates advised parents to bring suit against 
the school board to quicken the pace of desegregation, her 
home was under attack. As she reported to the U.S. 
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Justice Department in a telegram of July 1959, 
my home has ben under constant attack since October 
1956 by lawless elements of this state; and many 
threats have been made upon my life and the lives of 
my immediate family. Incendiary bombs have been 
thrown at our home from automobiles. Three KKK 
crosses have been burned on our lawn. Fire has been 
set to the house on two occasions. All the glass in 
the front of the house has been broken out and steel 
screens had to be 7~ade to cover the front windows to protect our home. 
Bates also suffered because of her stance in a much more 
personal way. She and her husband had a foster child, 
Clyde Cross Bates, who lived with them from 1951 to 1957. 
When the Bates came under attack in the fall of 1957, the 
state removed Clyde and returned him to his biological 
family. Southern whites also used their most potent 
weapon --economic reprisals-- against "uppity blacks" and 
those wayward whites who foolishly challenged white 
prerogatives in determining the position of blacks in 
southern society. By October of 1959, Daisy and L. C. 
Bates saw almost twenty years of their lives lost as their 
Arkansas State Press, one of the largest black newspapers 
in the southwest, went under due to a well orchestrated 
b b h . d . 74 oycott y w 1te a vert1sers. 
Dunbar Ogdon, Jr., a Presbyterian minister in 
Little Rock and an unwavering supporter of Bates's actions, 
like other similarly situated whites also felt the economic 
reprisals that accompanied his stance. Ogdon's commitment 
to civil rights went beyond calling for prayers for peace: 
" ••• unlike most of his integrationist colleagues [among 
white clergy, Ogdon] was neither cautious nor compromising 
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in his approach to Little Rock's crisis." Almost as soon 
as he arrived at his new post at Central Presbyterian 
Church in September 1954, he preached sermons "explicitly 
supporting integration as a Christian imperative." He was 
there to escort the nine black students on their first day 
at Central on 9 September 1957. 
Mr. Ogdon led his Presbytery in voting to oppose the 
actions of governor Faubus which resulted in the 
Governor saying that the Presbyterian ministers of 
Arkansas w, 5e Communists, brain-washed and fellow travelers. 
Ogdon also stood alone among his colleagues in his public 
praise of Eisenhower's belated decision to send troops to 
Arkansas. In the end, however, Ogdon was forced out of 
his pastorship at Central Presbyterian Church in Little 
Rock on 1 November 1958, because of his uncompromising 
stance against forced segregation. 76 
In many respects there were two distinct views of 
community life in Little Rock, Arkansas at the time that 
Brown v. Board of Education was decided. For most whites, 
Little Rock exemplified the New South. As Superintendent 
of Schools Blossom recalled in his 1959 book, 
It Happened Here, 
Little Rock was proud, too, of its reputation as a 
city of excellent race relations. Buses, hospitals, 
and certain other public facilities were integrated. 
biracial meetings commonly strove in a spirit of 
harmony to solve problems. Negro and white 
employees worked side by side on many jobs with a 
minimum of tension and friction. And despite a 
general traditional attitude in favor of 
segregation, the majority of residents were prepared 
--reluctantly-- to accept the United States Supreme 
Court 1954 school desegregation decision as the law 
of the land and to initiate a program of gradual 
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integra 7~on of Negro students into Central High School. 
However, African Americans in Little Rock held a different 
view of community life. Bates most succinctly expressed 
this view: 
Much has been written by some of the world's most 
renowned novelists of the new South, but the 
experience of the past few months in Arkansas shows 
clearly that we are not dealing with a new South. 
But instead, we a 78 dealing with a confused South 
and a New Negro." 
To blacks, Little Rock only gave the impression of being 
part of the New South. In the 1950's, black Arkansans 
lived in a state that was still unable to shed "the cloak 
of ignorance, superstition and traditions which shielded 
her during the pre-reconstruction era." Schools were 
nominally desegregated only with federal intervention in 
1957. Hotels, restaurants, ten-cent stores, lunch 
counters, public facilities, churches, and public 
recreation areas were still strictly segregated in 1962. 79 
Little Rock, the capital of Arkansas, is located in 
almost the exact center of the state. With a population 
of more than 100,000 and a progressive image, Little Rock 
in 1954 well represented its image of an aggressively 
industrializing southern state. According to the 1950 cen 
sus, there were 78,600 white residents (including 970 
foreign-born whites) and 23,425 black residents. Although 
Little Rock had a small black middle class --clusters of 
independent professionals and clergy--the income disparity 
between black residents and white residents was significant. 
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The reported median income of whites in 1949 was $2,122, 
while for blacks it stood at $881 --less than half the 
white median. Additionally, no black resident of Little 
Rock reported earnings of more than $5,000 for 1949. Ten 
years later, "of the approximately 28,000 families in 
Little Rock, • 4,000 had incomes over $10,000 per 
year." Coupled with the virtual exclusion of blacks 
politically and the de jure practice of segregation, Little 
Rock may have been a progressive city in race relations to 
whites, but because of the white majority's economic, 
social, and political dominance, African Americans 
participated in bi-racial meetings, while whites 
determined the local political discourse in which race 
1 . . d 80 re at1ons ex1ste. 
In Little Rock~ like in other southern cities, it 
was the civic leaders (business elites) who were in charge. 
According to Irving Spitzberg, a native of Little Rock, in 
his study of the Little Rock political structure, "the 
'civic' leaders had established a long tradition of 
activism in Little Rock and (when they felt secure in 
their actions) demonstrated the ability to use economic, 
social, and political power effectively." It was the 
younger members of this business community, who actively 
initiated a campaign for good government in the early 
fifties. They spearheaded a campaign for a state law th at 
would allow municipalities to choose the city management 
form of government. Civic leaders in Little Rock formed 
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the Committee of One Hundred, a group of businessmen 
associated with the Little Rock Chamber of Commerce, to 
funnel money into and organize the campaign calling for 
adoption of city management in a local referendum. 
Power --political, social, and economic-- was in the 
hands of the business elite, for the people of 
Little Rock, at the civic leaders' instigation, had 
repuijiated the Mayor and his Council at the ballot 
box. 
It was this group who held a greater potential to 
guide Little Rock in desegregation in public schools, but 
like the federal government, they declined the position. 
Their interest lay in maintaining the status quo and in 
creating an image that would attract new industry to the 
city. To prevent a recurrence of the economic slowdown 
that the Montgomery business community experienced during 
the Montgomery bus boycott in 1956, the Little Rock leaders 
took the initiative to desegregate public buses in their 
city. As a lame duck, Mayor Woodrow Wilson Mann and his 
Council were ineffective in desegregating Central High. 
It was incumbent upon Little Rock's civic leaders to act 
in good faith and take a public stand. To understand 
their failure to take an active role, we must look at the 
process by which Little Rock would proceed with 
d . 8 2 eseg reg a tion. 
Just five days after the Brown I decision, the 
Little Rock Board of Education of which Virgil Blossom was 
superintendent, announced that it would comply with the 
court order: 
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It is our responsibility to comply with Federal 
Constitutional requirements and we intend to do so 
when the Supreme Court of the United ij3ates 
outline[s] the method to be followed. 
The school board also stressed that its segregated school 
system would remain in effect until further instructions 
from the Court: 
Until the Supreme Court of the United States makes 
its decision of May 17, 1954 more specific, Little 
Rock Schg~l District will continue with its present 
program. 
More importantly, this same cautiously worded statament 
reemphasized a southern white commitment to segregation 
that would serve as an intellectual basis for any future 
desegregation plans. First, the board officially opposed 
integration, but it recognized its responsibility to abide 
by federal laws. Second, the board defended its 
segregated school system. Regardless of the Court's 
finding that "separate educational facilities are 
inherently unequal", the school board claimed equality 
among all-black and all-white schools. The most 
significant element, however, was how the board narrowly 
viewed desegregation as a court-imposed remedy. Hence, 
all the board could do was hope that Little Rock would 
pull together for "the creation of an integrated school 
program required as a result of the Supreme Court 
d . . ..85 ec1s1on. 
The black ~ommunity in Little Rock, as most black 
Americans did, rejoiced at hearing the Supreme Court's May 
1954 ruling. The Bates' Arkansas State Press in an 
43 
editorial called the decision" ••• a great forward step 
in achieving true equality for our race." Initially, black 
leaders had a tentative faith in the school board: " 
while moving all too slowly, [they recognized that the 
school board] was determined to obey the law at least in 
token form." However, with the gubernatorial success of 
Orval Faubus in the fall of 1954, their tentative faith 
began to weaken. During the race, Faubus issued a 
statament on integration in which he clearly sided with 
the pro-segregation camp. He proclaimed that 
It is evident to me that Arkansas is not ready for a 
complete and sudden mixing of the races in the 
public schools and that any attempt to solve this 
problem by pressure or mandatory methods will 
jeopardize, in many communities, the good relations 
which exist between whites and Negroes ••• In my 
opinion, de-segregation is the 8~o.l issue of this gubernatorial campaign ••• " 
Unlike the incumbent governor, Francis A. Cherry, who had 
announced that "Arkansas would obey the law" following the 
May 1954 decision, Faubus implicitly rejected Arkansas's 
responsibility to support the Brown decision. 87 
Added to the new political situation on the state 
level, blacks also began to question the school board's 
commitment to desegregation. Viewing its public statement 
of May 1954 as the beginning of a desegregation process, 
African Americans were concerned that the school board was 
not acting to achieve these goals. When in 1955 there was 
still no action, a group of black parents requested a 
meeting with Superintendent Blossom: 
Negro parents requested an appoinbnent with the 
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superintendent of the school board. After some 
delay and disappointments a meeting was held, but 
with no success. A petition signed by more than 100 
was then filed with the school board urging 
compliance with the 8~ourt decision. No action was taken by the board. 
From the perspective of most African Americans, these 
parents were seeking immediate desegregation of Little 
Rock's school system. But considering the school board's 
earlier statement that it would not proceed without 
further direction from the Supreme Court, such action was 
highly doubtful. Nevertheless, they wanted a signal, 
preferably in the form of a plan for desegregation, that 
the school board was working on the situation. They got a 
signal from the school board --albeit the wrong one. 
Following the Supreme Court's Brown II implementation 
decision of May 1955, Superintendent of Schools Virgil 
Blossom announced an open-ended plan for "a transition to 
a system of racially desegregated schools in several 
successive stag es": De segregation "may start in 19 57" on 
the high school level. Over the next six to twelve years, 
the high schools, junior highs, and elementary schools 
would be desegregated in that order. However, each stage 
of the plan was dependent upon the success of 
89 desegregation in the previously segregated grade levels. 
Bates and others involved in the local NAACP 
immediately recognized that under the proposed plan 
desegregation would take years. Frustrated over the Little 
Rock School Board's lack of responsiveness to their needs, 
a group of black parents a tte..mpted to enroll their 
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children in all-white schools. The school board denied 
them - entrance and in February of 1956, the local chapter 
of the NAACP on behalf of thirty-three students filed a 
lawsuit to force full integration immediately. 
The hearing was held in August, 1956 at which time 
the Little rock School Board presented a plan fo~ 0 gradual integration to be completed in 12 years. 
Federal Judge John E. Miller of the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas upheld the 
constitutionality of the plan in Aaron v. Cooper. As the 
Reverend J.C. Crenshaw of the Little Rock NAACP wrote in a 
press release following the decision, 
However, neither we or our attorneys regard the plan 
as conforming wit~ ~he §ral intent of the U.S. 
Supreme Court dec1s1on. 
With the aid of Thurgood Marshall, attorneys for the local 
chapter appealed Judge.Miller's decision to the Court . of 
Appeals for the 8th Circuit. Citing that "little children 
are still being forced to go to schools at great distances 
from their homes, when other schools are within walking 
distance," under the proposed plan, the NAACP hoped the 
1 la 1 . 11 9 2 Appea s Court wou over-rue M1 er. 
The Appeals Court on 26 April 1957 affirmed the 
lower court's decision. Although blacks in Little Rock did 
not favor the school board's plan, the NAACP did win three 
important points in the decision. First, the Appeals 
Court placed the Little Rock plan under federal 
jurisdiction: "jurisdiction of this case shall be retained 
by the District Court to insure full opportunity for 
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further showing in the event compliance at the 'earliest 
practicable date' ceases to be the objective." This legal 
maneuver would allow the NAACP to respond quickly in the 
event that opponents of the plan attempted to use the 
state courts to prevent its implementation. Second, the 
court established the 1957-1958 school year as the 
starting date for desegregation. Third, the court 
rejected the idea of a flexible timetable. It instead 
reduced the implementation schedule from a possible twelve 
years to a definite six years. African Americans were 
still shut out of the desegregation formulating process in 
Little Rock, but they were not passive. They continually 
attempted to shape the school board's plans between May 
1954 and April 1956; Little Rock's black community first 
acted in a spirit of cooperation. When that failed, they 
resorted to the federal courts. 93 
As Superintendent Blossom and the Little Rock 
School Board went about presenting their desegregation plan 
to the white community, blacks and their white friends in 
Little Rock were attempting to prod the school board into 
going beyond a presentation, to actual planning for school 
desegregation. Between June 1955, the date that the school 
board announced its phase plan for desegregation, and 
September 1957, Superintendent Blossom made over 200 
speeches to professional groups and clubs. Blossom 
preached to these audiences the board's own personal 
distaste for desegregation. As Colbert S. Cartwright, a 
clergyman in Little Rock wrote soon after federal 
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intervention in 1957: "The general attitude of Dr. Blossom 
in explaining the plans for integration to white groups 
was that the prospect was as distasteful to him and the 
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school board as to anyone else." 
Blossom and the school board spent most of their 
time listening to the concerns of whites, rather than 
attempting to rally an already skeptical white majority 
around its plan. According to the Arkansas Gazette, 
Blossom and the board instead discussed how their plan 
was a legal design intended to accomplish the 
minimum integration over the longest period 9~f time permissible under the Supreme Court ruling. 
In these meetings school officials continually emphasized 
how, in formulating their plan, they considered the 
psychological damage that the required desegregation would 
caused to white citizens: 
We can comply with the law if we are given a long 
period so that we can take small steps in developing 
and activating a very gradual program of integration 
that will be acceptable to the large 9~ajority in a border state community such as this. 
Thus from the very beginning of the desegregation process 
in Little Rock, the school board was most concerned about 
how desegregation would affect the white majority. In 
their quest "to do everything possible to maintain 
educational standards," school officials failed to reflect 
upon how the city's segregated school system had affected 
the educational prospects of black students for the last 
eighty years. Absent among school officials' concerns was 
a concern for the African American minority in Little Rock, 
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the majority of whose children would be forced to remain in 
. f . h 1 97 1n er1or sc oo s. 
Being "guided by the reactions of [white] parents 
and civic leaders," Blossom repeatedly told his concerned 
audiences, 
we must do everything possible to maintain 
educational standards and that can be best achieved 
with the voluntary cooperation of Negro 98sidents in a plan of orderly, gradual integration." 
Hence, when officials did mention how blacks could play a 
role in the school board's plan, holding true to white 
paternalism, Blossom called upon black citizens to follow 
a white lead. Rather than emphasizing the responsibility 
that all of Little Rock had in insuring that desegregation 
proceeded "with all deliberate speed," Blossom reminded 
the black community of the "great responsibility [that] 
now rests on Negro citizens." As far as school officials 
were concerned, they had assembled a reasonable plan for 
. desegregation, based on a system of voluntary transfers, 
which if not challenged by African Americans would lead to 
token . desegregation for less than 1% of the city's black 
students. In the view of school officials, this was all 
that the white majority of Little Rock could handle in the 
short term. 9 9 
Importantly, the Little Rock School Board failed to 
make any concrete plans to prepare the wider community for 
the beginning of school desegregation. In fact, when 
black leaders and liberal whites suggested these 
preparations, they were rebuffed with open hostility. In 
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October of 1955, Dr. Blossom met with the Arkansas Council 
on Human Relations, a statewide interracial group 
dedicated to racial understanding. According to 
Spi t zber g , this group composed of white liberals and some 
blacks whose liberalism could be defined as racial 
liberalism, rather than an economic one. Members of the 
Human Relations Councils, which existed in most urban 
centers in the South were typically well-educated, 
professionals and their spouses. Irene Osborne, a member 
of the group who had worked with Washington, D.C. 
authorities earlier on community preparations for school 
desegregation, suggested that the same broad-based 
community involvement could also prepare Little Rock • 
. ~ccording to Spitzberg and Cartwright, 
Mr. Blossom responded to Miss Osborne's remarks not 
only by disregarding her suggestions, but also by 
making it clear that he was hostile to the concept of 
broad preparation involving the total community in 
the positive manner, which the authorities had used 
in Washington ••• Dr. Blossom exhibit58 open hostility 
toward the approach she suggested. 
Blossom and the school board rejected each request of 
assistance that came their way in the period leading up to 
September 1957. Concerned about possible racial strife, 
the black ministers of the Alliance of Greater Little 
Rock, a group of black clergy from various denominations, 
asked the school board to appoint an advisory committee to 
assist in any plans, and they too were rebuffed. 
The board not only declined, but refused to suggest 
any alternative way in which the Little Rock 
commu~i~y mi~~t help in paving the way to a smooth 
trans1t1on. 
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School officials also rejected the offer of the 
predominately white Little Rock Ministerial Alliance's 
offer to endorse publicly the board's plan. Each of these 
two clergy groups held a great potential to affect a 
102 
smooth transition to a desegregated school system. 
Even those working at Central High, many of whom 
were not fully accepting of the pending desegregation, 
recognized what the school board refused to do. Early in 
1955, Jesse Mathews, principle at Central High School, 
called faculty together into committees on guidance and 
community cooperation to begin preparing white students 
for the impending integration. 
The committees began meeting in the fall of 1955. 
But Mr. Mathews called an abrupt halt to these 
activities. He explained to the teachers that Mr. 
Blossom had decided . he wanted to handle the matter 
personally for the time beipij 3 That was the last the committees heard of it. 
The school board's refusal to accept outside assistance, 
in part, reflected the logic behind the plan itself. Had 
they intended to alter the cultural patterns of Little 
Rock and end desegregation, perhaps wider community 
involvement would have been accepted. However, their plan 
was designed specifically to prevent that. As Blossom 
repeated often, the Little Rock plan was designed with the 
advice of the board's legal counsel to meet the legal 
. . f . . 104 
m1n:unum o 1ntegrat1on. 
The plan itself, widely known as the Blossom plan, 
called for gradual desegregation over a seven year period 
commencing September 1957. Initially conceived as a plan 
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to desegregate on the first grade level and then, upon 
careful assessment of success, the school board would 
allow further desegregation up the grade levels to the 
high school level. Representative of the unequal race 
relations in Little Rock in which the rights and attitudes 
of whites were taken much more seriously than those of 
black residents was the manner in which the board revised 
its plans after white parents objected. After what Blossom 
called, strenuous objections from white parents of primary 
school children, the board ·moved to begin desegregation on 
the senior high level first. 
I first began to realize that it would not work when 
I talked to groups at the (white) PTA meetings. 
Almost invariably, the parents who were most 
outspoken against integration had children in the 
lowest grades at school. The younger the children, 
the more violent the parents were in tf~!r 
denunciations of the Court's decision. 
Desegregation ultimately would be achieved in three 
phases, beginning on the high school level, then the 
junior high, followed by the elementary school level. 
This was a reversal of the original Blossom plan and 
reflected the powerful influence of conservative white 
. . 106 
op1n1on. 
Nevertheless, the plan was not designed to 
desegregate Little Rock's entire school system. Th.rough a 
system of voluntary transfers and a board-implemented 
screening process, the school board's plan virtually 
guaranteed only token desegregation. As Superintendent 
Blossom acknowledged in his book, 
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The Board's purpose in regard to transfers was to 
lessen the impact of integration on local cultural 
patterns by a system of voluntary transfers allowing 
both white and colored students to maintain, as fa, 
as possible, the system of segregated education. 
These administrative procedures effectively placed the 
burden of desegregation on black school children as no 
white students were expected to request transfers to black 
schools: If black students wanted to attend the state's 
most highly academically-rated high school, Central High, 
or any other school in the city, it was their 
responsibility to request a transfer in a community where 
the majority of whites favored segregation. 
Furthermore, the Little Rock school system under 
the Blossom plan was divided into three separate high 
school attendance zones. These zones roughly corresponded 
to the pre-existing demographic patterns of segregation. 
Hence, between a system of voluntary transfers and 
gerrymandered attendance zones, Horace Mann in zone 1 would 
remain a black High school: Hall High in zone 3 would 
remain all white, while Central High School in zone 2 would 
serve as a tokenly desegregated school. Although each 
attendance zone was assigned one of the three senior high 
schools open in the 1957 school year, students could obtain 
permission to transfer to another school. Since the 
school board, under state's pupil placement law, had the 
authority to place students in a particular school, whites 
who found thamselves in the 'wrong' attendance zone, could 
108 
request a transfer. 
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Dividing the city into three attendance zones, in 
my opinion, was a fraud. The Little Rock School Board knew 
before hand that most, if not all, white students would 
want to continue at Central High (or all-white Hall High 
School). They also knew that most blacks, fearing white 
retaliation if they attended overwhelmingly white schools, 
would opt for Horace Mann. As they assumed, whites in 
fact did transfer out of zone 1 and most blacks did stay 
at the all-black high school. The zone system and 
voluntary transfers enabled the school board to wash its 
hands of a measure overwhelmingly opposed by whites; and 
yet, it still allowed school officials to claim they were 
k . t d d . 109 wor 1ng owar esegregat1on. 
Most revealing of school officials' attitudes 
toward desegregation was the manner in which black students 
were allowed to enroll at previously all-white schools 
under the Blossom plan. White students who desired a 
school transfer received an administrative okay, while 
black students were required to undergo a battery of 
psychological and academic evaluations. Blossom, who held 
a master of science degree in education, single-handedly 
decided the academic fate of each black student. Unlike 
white students, whose 'whiteness' was taken as a sign of 
their academic ability, black students had to prove their 
, h . , 110 wort 1ness. 
Blossom's own account of the interview format, 
later published in 1959, clearly demonstrated how the 
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school board's plan lent itself to a reinforcement of a 
white paternalistic concern for controlled black 
advancement. School officials counselled the parents of 
each black child who made a transfer request of the 
"problems that any children would face in a pilot program 
of integration." These talks were not designed to prepare 
students for the pressures they would possibly confront in 
an overwhelmingly white school: As Blossom reminded school 
administrators, "Then in your talks with students and 
parents it should be your purpose to guide those who are 
not equipped away from participation in the transition 
program." Blossom and the school board never considered 
establishing a similar procedure for white students who 
would find the transition program equally as 
h 11 . 111 ca eng1ng. 
Blossom's interviewing technique also appeared 
rather crude. When "two terrific football players from 
·Horace Mann --both over six feet tall-- came ••• to enroll in 
Central High," the superintendent went out of his way to 
express how their presence at the school would seriously 
affect the white students. Besides noting that their 
academic performance was below average (Blossom never 
discussed what happened to white children who were 
attending Central whose scholastic achievements were below 
average, nor did he explain how an average was 
determined), Blossom "felt it would be a serious mistake 
for them to transfer." Blossom reasoned that their 
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presence on the football team would cause a disturbance 
among white students and would cause other high schools to 
cancel games with Central's desegregated football team. 
As Blossom counselled them in the best tradition of 
paternalistic relations, "So you would not only not get to 
play but you would be depriving others of a chance to 
play." According to the Superintendent, their response 
was one of thankfulness: "Mr. blossom ••• nobody had 
explained that to us and we didn't understand the 
situation." Perhaps no one explained it in those terms 
because those black citizens of Little Rock in the 
vanguard of school segregation were no longer willing to 
forgo equality and equal access to public educational 
opportunities simply out of deference to "white 
·b·l· . n 112 sens1 1 1t1es. 
In another case, Blossom counselled an appreciative 
mother and her daughter to withdraw a transfer application 
to Central: 
'You and I are trying to make a decision in the best 
interest of this child,' I told her mother in the 
girl's presence. 'In view of these factors 
[Blossom's perception that the child lacked 'the 
necessary scholastic background and emotional 
stability'], I recommend that you withdraw her 
application.' 
• • • 'I ~elf~'1e you're right, Mr. Blossom,' the 
mother said. 
Blossom failed to recognize however that he and the girl's 
mother perhaps did share the same view of what was in the 
best interest of this student. While the girl's mother 
may have been motivated by a belief that Central could 
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offer her daughter a better education than what she was 
then receiving at Mann, Blossom's perception of her best 
interests was tainted by other concerns over limited 
desegregation. 
In the end, if black citizens wanted a desegregated 
public school system, they would have to request a transfer 
into Central High school. Of the several hundred eligible 
to transfer, only eighty black students applied. From the 
initial interview process 32 were selected by Blossom, and 
after final screening, 17 were selected to attend Central. 
Ultimately, only nine actually enrolled at Central High for 
the 1957-58 school year. 114 
Each of these families, like others who advocated 
changes in race relations in Little Rock, were exposed to 
white economic and social reprisals. The families of all 
nine students, who actually desegregated Central High in 
September 1957, suffered from white reprisals. Jefferson 
Thomas's father, Ellis Thomas, was fired after ten years 
employment with International Harvester in Little Rock; 
Elizabeth Eckford's mother was fired from her teaching 
position at the State School for the Blind; Carlotta 
Walls's father was forced to seek out of state employment 
since no building contractors in the area would hire hLm; 
and Terrance Robert's family moved to California to escape 
the harassments. Nevertheless, individual black families 
were still willing to stand for black equality in Little 
Rock. Hence, as far as the Little Rock Board of Education 
57 
and its superintendent of schools were concerned, 17 
African American students out of a total school population 
of 2,650 students at Central High School constituted 
"integration" of that schooi. 115 
The constitutional/political crisis of 1957-1958, 
collectively recorded as the Little Rock Crisis, must be 
posited in this much wider context of Little Rock's race 
relations in order to understand the full historical 
meaning of desegregation at Central High School. As a 
contemporary wrote, 
Governor Faubus' decision on September 2 to call out 
the troops and to block integration was the natural 
outcome of every step the Little Rock School Board 
had taken. Having sought to prepare the community 
solely upon a legalistic basis, they had no defense 
when the governor, prompted by rabid segregationists 
in Little 1~~ck, insisted he had found the needed loophole. 
From the very beginning, the board's strategies for 
implementing even the bare minimum of desegregation 
awaited failure. 
Antithetical to Blossom's belief that had the 
governor not intervened, Central High would have been 
successfully integrated in 1957, the lack of community 
preparation almost guaranteed a crisis would erupt. 
Instead of rallying community support among whites, school 
officials were "guided by the reaction of parents and civic 
leaders." Blossom focused on gaining acceptance from 
civic and business elites, rather than focusing on any 
genuine community involvement. As one local manufacturer 
said: 
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They talked to the Little Rock Club, the Chamber of 
Commerce, the Rotary --the same people over and 
over. They missed the people with children in the 
public schools who believed theif 19hildren would be injured by [school integration]. 
Blossom also ignored the black community. When 
Blossom and the school board did discuss their plans with 
leaders of the black community, these discussions were 
often like briefings. During one in early 1954 (following 
the school board's announcement that it would comply with 
the court decision), the editor of the State Press, L. C. 
Bates, husband of Daisy Bates, asked whether the school 
board intended on full integration as soon as possible. 
Blossom replied, "No ••• it must be done slowly." Later in 
the same meeting, Blossom reiterated what he would often 
say to blacks and whites over the next three years, 
A greater responsibility now rests on Negro 
citizens ••• we must approach this problem carefully 
and sanely. The School Board will not delay merely 
f<:>r de:tf~'s sake but to be able to do the job 
r 1gh t. 
Blossom's belief that Little Rock's black community was in 
great support of the board's plan was not shaken, even in 
1959, when he claimed that "we had the cooperation of 
probably 95 per cent of the Negro citizens." This 1n 
spite of the fact that the NAACP and other members of the 
black community continually had been pressuring the school 
board to act more quickly via petitions, court cases, and 
h 1 a . 119 personal requests for sc oo esegregation. 
While the school board was refusing to rally 
support for the Blossom plan, ardent segregationists were 
59 
at the state house developing a highly organized resistance 
campaign. They were actively promoting legislation that 
would nullify the spirit and letter of the Brown 
decisions. In the spring 1957 legislative season, four 
segregationist bills passed the state legislature: House 
Bill 322 established a state sovereignty commission which 
was given "the authority to resist the United States 
Supreme Court's decision against segregation in public 
schools; House Bill 323 made attendance in a desegregated 
school voluntary; House Bill 325 also allowed local school 
boards to use public funds for hiring lawyers to fight 
desegregation orders.; and House Bill 324 was aimed at 
organizations like the NAACP. This last law "required 
persons and organizations in certain activities to 
register with the State and make regular reports of their 
income and expenses" --including membership disclosure. 
Although the NAACP and other groups, black and white, 
opposed the passage of these bills, each passed with 
overwhelming support. Ardent segregationist views, 
coupled with the absence of any leadership required for 
integration to proceed in Little Rock, ultimately dictated 
1 . t. 1 d. . th t . f k 120 po 1 1ca 1scourse 1n e sta e o Aransas. 
Although we may never know the exact number of ardent 
segregationists, many of the city's white residents wanted 
to avoid the Brown decision if legally possible. Mrs. J. 
H. Edmondson of Little Rock wrote to President Eisenhower, 
expressing many of the thoughts other white residents who 
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also wrote would articulate: 
You say everyone has a responsibility to support and 
obey orders. [A]nd I am sure 90 per cent of the 
People want to as long as that order is a just one. 
[B]ut we [are] not going to obey any thing that not 
just. and you certainly know it 1 ~£t just to force 
our children to mix with Negros. 
Another white mother wrote, 
I am a mother with 1 thirteen year old son, 
actually, integration with the negro race won't hurt 
him too much. However, I would fight it and will 
fight it with every way I can. If I were a mother 
of small children just beginning school, I would do 
battle if necessary. Me, and millions like me, the 
parents, especially the mothers, ap2~ot want this thing we are being forced to take. 
Another writer from Little Rock encouraged President 
Eisenhower to help southern whites obey federal laws, by 
condemning the Supreme Court's Brown decisions. A 
resident of Little Rock who claimed never having voted for 
Faubus, Grady Forgy wrote, 
I, as well as most honorable citizens --certainly 
the intensely patriotic Anglo-Saxon people of the 
south heartily agree with you that ours is supposed 
to be, should be a government of laws ••• Why in 
heavens name did you not and why don't you now 
denounce with firmness the arrogant, arbitrary and 
tyrannical usurpation of the befuddled f~~reme Court 
of legislative functions of government? 
Hence, segregationist victories in the state legislature 
joined with the general attitude among whites that 
desegregation was being forced upon the South, and Little 
Rock in particular, helped fill the vacuum of political 
leadership in Little Rock. 
As Daisy Bates emphasized in her assessment of the 
Little Rock Crisis, 
However, the majority of Little Rock citizens, 
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frustrated by fear and vi£~~nce, was unwilling to 
check what was happening. 
Ardent segregationist groups like the Capital Citizens 
Council, an affiliate of the White Citizens Councils 
proliferating throughout the South, and later the Mothers 
League of Central High School were able to capitalize on 
this ambivalent crisis of conscience. They shnply filled 
a vacuum in political leadership, moving political 
discourse further and further to the right, as the date 
for desegregating Central approached. By August 1957, you 
were either a segregationist or an integrationist. By 
September, the month in which the Blossom plan would be 
implemented, ardent segregationists had a well organized 
campaign backed by the authority of Governor Faubus, 
moderates had virtually none, and the African American 
community stood alone. 
On 29 August 1957, just one week before Little Rock 
schools were scheduled to open, a Mrs. Clyde A. Thomason 
filed suit in Pulaski Chancery Court seeking a temporary 
injunction against school desegregation in Little Rock. A 
member of the recently organized Mothers League of Little 
Rock Central High School, a group dedicated to preserving 
segregation, she contended that the school children's 
safety was in jeopardy. Her lawyers based this on rumors 
that black and white teenagers were arming themselves. 
Ironically, according to Bates, few of the members of the 
Mothers League actually had children attending Central 
High. The state court granted the stay, but lawyers for 
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the NAACP appealed the following day, and Judge Davies of 
the U.S. District Court overruled the lower court. What 
was significant about the case was the surprise witness, 
Governor Faubus, who testified on behalf of the petitioner 
that he feared violence. He would use these same reasons 
one week later to justify his calling out of the Arkansas 
National Guara. 125 
On the morning of 2 September 1957, just one day 
before the scheduled opening of Little Rock schools, Faubus 
ordered the Arkansas National Guard to surround Central 
High; and he ordered National Guard Adjunct General 
Sherman T. Clinger to prevent black students from 
attending classes at the school: 
You are directed to place off limits to white 
students those schools for colored students and to 
place off limits to colored students those schools 
heretofor 12iperated and recently set up for white 
students. 
White students began classes the following day, as did 
black students who attended segregated Horace Mann High 
School and other 'black' schools in the city. Only those 
nine black students who challenged school segregation were 
denied access to public education under the governor's 
orders • . With the state of Arkansas's blessing, all public 
schools in Little Rock would remain segregated until 
. 127 further notice. 
Under the pretext of maintaining "the peace and 
good order," Faubus preserved the racial status quo in 
Little Rock, Arkansas. Duplicitously he explained over the 
63 
public air waves that evening, 
The mission of the State Militia is to maintain or 
restore order and to protect the lives and property 
of citizens. They will act not as segregationists 
or integrationist, but as soldiers call 1~8to active duty to carry out their assigned tasks. 
Faubus understood however, as did many whites, that 
desegregation would cement a shift in power relations 
between blacks and whites and those between federal and 
I 
state authorities. 
But, I must state here in all sincerity that it is 
my opinion -- yes, even a conviction, that it will 
not be possible to restore or to maintain order and 
protect the lives and property of the citizens if 
forcible integration is carried out tomorrow in the 
schools of this community. The inevitable 
conclusion therefore must be that the schools in 
Pulaski county, for the time being, must be operated 
on thf 2§ame basis as they have been operated in the past. 
Hence, like many white southerners, Faubus's response to 
black demands for equality was a white call to arms in 
defense of 'our way of life'. 
Faubus's actions temporarily lifted the s -chool 
board's burden of desegregation. Immediately following the 
gover n or's actions, the Little Rock School Board issued a 
statement requesting that those nine black students not 
attend Central. Blossom explained, 
although the Federal Court has ordered integration 
to proceed, Governor Faubus has said that schools 
should continue as they have in the past and has 
stationed troops at Central High School to maintain 
order. 
In view of this situation, we ask that no negro 
students attempt to attend Central or any whit 13~igh 
school until this dilemma is legally resolved. 
The school board also returned to federal court the 
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following day; the board asked for a stay in the execution 
of the Blossom plan in light of unforeseen circumstances. 
Legal counsel for the nine students argued that granting a 
stay would be tantamount to sanctioning the actions of the 
state of Arkansas. Judge Davies of the 8th Circuit denied 
the school's petition, citing that, 
The evidence presented to this Court reveals no 
reason why the original plan of integration app 3£ved by this Court cannot be carried out forthwith. 
Nevertheless, the school board made little attempt to 
carry out its desegregation plan. Carlotta Walls, 
Jefferson Thomas, Elizabeth Eckford, Thelma Mothershed, 
Melba Patillo, Ernest Green, Terrance Roberts, Gloria Ray, 
and Minniejean Brown, the "Little Rock 9", were denied 
access to Central High for the next three weeks. 
Importantly, Faubus's actions moved public 
discourse on desegregation away from issues of justice and 
black equality to the relative safety of 'law and order'. 
·Faubus' s defensive claims of outside interference and 
forced integration served in obscuring the monolith of a 
white power structure in the State of Arkansas. These 
actions revealed themselves for what they were, not an 
attempt to preserve public safety, but an angry and 
desperate stab at preserving white power. The words 'law 
and order' served as a code for 'maintaining black 
s ub or a i n at ion' • 
The Eisenhower administration initially refused to 
act in Little Rock. In his 3 September 1957 press 
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conference, President Eisenhower again counselled patience, 
stressing that 
there are very strong emotions on the other side, 
people that see a picture of a mongrelization of the 
race, they call it ••• They are very strong emotions, 
and we are going to whip this thing in the long run 
by Amerifj~s being true to themselves and not merely 
the law. 
Eisenhower himself viewed Faubus' s actions not as a 
violation of u.s. law, but as a "road block thrown in the 
way of [the Blossom] plan." As far as the president was 
concerned, "the next decision will have to be by the 
lawyers and jurists. 11133 
The Eisenhower administration acted in Little Rock 
only after being told to do so by the federal courts. On 9 
September, Judge Davies ordered the U.S. Justice 
Department and Attorney General Herbert Brownell to enter 
Aaron v. Cooper as amici curiae. The following day, the 
department filed "an application for preliminary 
injunction against Governor Faubus and the commanding 
officers of the National Guard." 134 
The federal government acted cautiously following 
the District Court's instructions to participate in the 
Little Rock case. The New York Times reported on the 11th 
that while on his Newport golf vacation, 
President Eisenhower counseled 'patience' today in 
dealing with 13ge tense school integration dispute in Little rock. 
When Eisenhower officials did take an active role in 
resolving the constitutional crisis, they still hoped 
Faubus would conform to court orders without federal 
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intervention. The president met with the governor on 14 
September 1957 "to counsel together. 11136 
A few day later, on September 20th, Judge Davies 
ruled that the Arkansas governor's use of the national 
guard constituted a "violation of the rights of the Negro 
children under the 14th Amendment' and so ordered, 
The three defendants [Governor Faubus and two 
officers of the Arkansas National Guard], all 
persons subject to their orders, and 'all persons in 
active concert, participation or privity with them' 
are enjoined from obstructing or preventing the 137 
entry of eligible Negro ,students to the school. · 
Faubus responded that evening by withdrawing the guard, 
and refusing to assist city authorities in maintaining 
public order once a mob began to form. As die hard 
segregationists took to the streets and the mob grew more 
and more unruly over the next couple days, the Eisenhower 
administration was forced to became an active participant 
in resolving the immediate constitutional crisis. 
Eisenhower issued a proclamation on 23 September 1957, 
"commanding all persons engaged in such obstruction of 
justice to cease and desist therefrom, and to disperse 
forthwith." Once that failed, and the administration 
received a direct plea from Mayor Mann for federal help, 
138 Eisenhower called out the federal troops. 
On 24 September of 1957, Eisenhower ordered the 
101st Airborne Division to Little Rock with the express 
purpose of maintaining law and order and of enforcing the 
specific lower court order to proceed with the Blossom 
plan. In a nationally televised speech at the White House 
67 
that evening, the president emphasized the limited capacity 
of their mission: 
Now, let me make it very clear that the Federal 
troops are not being used to relieve local and state 
authorities of their primary duty to preserve the 
peace and order of the community. Nor are the 
troops there for the purpose of taking over the 
responsibility of the School Board. The running of 
our school system and the maintenance of peace and 
order in each of our states are strictly local 
affairs and the Federal Government does not 
interfere except in a very few special cases and 
when requested by one of the several states. In the 
present case the troops are there, pursuant to law, 
solely for the purpose of prey 3§ting interference 
with the orders of the Court. 
Eisenhower emphasized that the presence of federal troops 
was necessitated by the state of Arkansas's refusal in 
maintaining law and order. "If resistance to the Federal 
Court orders ceases at once," the president continued, 
"the further presence of Federal Troops will be 
nl 40 
unnecessary ••• 
For Eisenhower, federal troops in Little Rock were 
there to defend American 'democracy' and our federal 
system of government. They were not there to enforce 
desegregation. He first made this distinction during his 
speech of the 24th and again, more explicitly, a week 
later during a press conference. On the 24th, the 
president reminded all Americans of the damage that the 
events in Little Rock were causing to the nation. 
At a time when we face grave situations abroad 
because of the hatred that Communism bears toward a 
system of government based on human rights, it would 
be difficult to exaggerate the harm that is being 
done to the prestige and influence, and indeed to 
the safety, of our nation and the world ••• Our enemies 
are gloating over this incident and using it 
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h t . h l . 141 everyw ere o misrepresent our woe nation. 
On 3 October 1957, he reinforced his earlier statements on 
federal intervention in Little Rock. 
They are there to uphold the courts of the land 
under a law that was passed in 1792, because it was 
early discovered that unless we supported the courts 
in whose hands are our freedoms and our liberties, 
our protection against autocratic government, the 
kind of government set up by our forefathers simply 
would not work. That is why they are there, and for 
no other purpose, it is merely incidental thf~ 2the problem grew out of the segregation problem. 
Thus, federal intervention in Little Rock was necessary to 
preserve the balance of power, it was not intended to 
support any specific court orders to desegregate. 
The president did not address the issue of black 
c ivi 1 rights in his actions from September 3 to September 
24, 1957. Administration officials continually interpreted 
the situation as a constitutional issue, first between the 
federal courts and the state of Arkansas, and then, when 
they acted, between the federal government and the state 
of Arkansas. Shut out were African Americans. Not once 
did administration officials consult the plaintiff's legal 
counsel or any black leaders. Roy Wilkins, executive 
director of the NAACP, expressed his anger over the fact 
that Eisenhower was meeting with whites and other 'sundry 
people' while ignoring those most affected: 
When you were troubled over the expressed views of 
Senator Richard B. Russell on the Civil Rights Bill 
you granted him a hearing. When you were troubled 
over the actions of Governor Orval E. Faubus of 
Arkansas you granted him a hearing. The citizens 
who have a prime and intensely personal interest in 
both of these situations were not offered an 
opportunity to be heard. Like all Americans they do 
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not relish debate and settlement of t£~1r destiny by 
others while they sit in an anteroom. 
Thurgood Marshall wrote to Eisenhower and Brownell, 
requesting 
inclusion in any meeting that related to Little Rock, 
As representative of negro pupils directly involved 
in litigation being discussed, would suggest you 
discuss matter with either parents or children 
involved or their lawyers before discussing matter 
with sundry people nri 4directly connected with litigation involved. 
In his telegram, Thurgood Marshall also renewed an NAACP 
request for a White House conference on desegregation that 
was originally suggested as early as the spring of 1956. 
In the end, these requests did not translate into a White 
f h 1 d . 145 House con erence on sc oo esegregat1on. 
Although the Federal Government restored order in 
Little Rock and thus ended the immediate political crisis 
during the 1957-1958 school year, the crisis in race 
relations not only continued, but also it intensified. For 
those nine black students who gained access to a better 
education at Central High, the crisis in race relations 
gained a more immediate prominence. Following the letter 
of the Brown decision, the school board, in devising a plan 
of minimal desegregation, made a distinction between a 
program of public education and its associated extra-
cur icul ar activities. 
Certain social functions of our schools which have 
been desirable in the past may have to be eliminated. 
(Social functions which would involve race mixing 
will not be held.) ••• The Board of Education 
authorizes from time to time, on an individual basis, 
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grade-level social clubs, formed and supervised by 
parents in co-operation with school faculty. Mixing 
of the races need not take place in these 
organizations ar 45hey are not a required part of the 
school program. 
As far as Blossom and board members were concerned, Brown 
only applied to classroom instruction, not athletics or 
other school-related activities and clubs. Thus the 
'Little Rock 9' were 'in' Central, but they were not 
accepted into the larger structure of public education at 
the school. A federal presence guaranteeed these nine 
students access to an improved public education, 
traditionally reserved for white, but it did not integrate 
·these students into the larger program, classroom 
instruction and accompanying clubs and activities. 
Besides their exclusion from the social aspects of 
learning, daily harassments, degradations, and 
humiliations were inflicted upon the nine students. Daisy 
Bates estimated that only a small group of white students, 
75 to 100 in number, were actually responsible for the 
harassment. However, a veil of silence among white 
students and the lack of a stated policy on harassment 
exaserbated the situation. On 12 November 1957, Thomas 
Jefferson, one of the black students, was knocked 
unconscious in the corridor. "At the time there were only 
two National Guardsmen stationed on each floor and none of 
the 101 troops." However, school officials did not take 
any immediate action against the white perpetrator, later 
identified as Hugh Williams, as no white students were 
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willing to identify him. On this occasion, as on others 
when a black student complained of harrassment, school 
officials reminded the student, parents, and Bates, that 
the perpetrator must admit the offense or the victim must 
produce two eye witnesses. In this instance, it took the 
intervention of a captain of the 101st Division to get 
Williams suspended for three days. Nevertheless, the 
relative isolation and the harassment of the nine black 
students increased after 27 November 1957, the day on 
which regular army personnel were withdrawn from Central 
High School. 147 
Minniejean Brown stood apart from the other black 
students at Central in how she responded to the incessant 
provocations. She fought back. As she told Clarence 
Laws, field secretary for the NAACP, a few days after her 
suspension for the lunchroom incident, 
She went into the school cafeteria ••• [on] 
Tuesday, December 17. Having obtained her lunch, 
which she carried on a tray, she started for a table. 
In doing so she walked between other tables with a 
small clearance for passage. At one point four boys 
who saw her approaching moved their chairs back into 
her path. She waited a moment: the boys moved their 
chairs back to their original positions clearing the 
passage. However, as she attempted to move, she was 
again blocked. The path was again cleared and as she 
attempted to proceed sidways once more, a chair was 
pushed into the front of her body. Her tray, which 
at this point was just above the head of the boy 
whose chair rested against her, was released causing 
chili and other items of food to 1~ijill upon this boy 
and another sitting next to him. 
Only Brown, not the two white students, "was suspended from 
school for an indefinite period" a a result of the 
incident. Although Laws hoped that "this could mark a 
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turning point in the relationship between our students and 
the whites," harassment actually increased as the federal 
presence in the school decreased during the 1957-1958 
149 
school year. 
Lack of discipline at Central reached a crisis 
point by the beginning of February 1958. In a letter to 
Val Washington, an officer of the National Republican 
Committee, J. R. Booker, a black lawyer in Little Rock 
associated with the NAACP, wrote, 
We further observe that recent weeks have been 
punctuated by incident after incident initiated by 
White students against the 9 Negro students at 
Central High School, so as to maintain a climate of 
fear, unrest and intimidation within the institution • 
• • • We attribute this situation to a too greatly 
relaxed program of protectiop 5an the part of the Federalized National Guards. 
In early February, Bates also wrote a letter to Washington 
in which she expressed the "feeling that the lack of 
discipline within the school is partially responsible for 
the stepped-up harassment and physical attacks on the 
children." Still, school officials refused to acknowledge 
these racial problems. As if these incidents were of an 
everyday nature, school officials addressed each harassment 
complaint of black students within the school's general 
discipline policy. 151 
The swift actions of school officials in mid-
February represented the racial double standard of conduct 
that existed at Central High School. For days, Minniejean 
Brown was taunted by a white girl. Each tLme this student 
saw her, she would call Brown a "Nigger looking bitch," 
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"until Minnie lashed out on her with all the supressed, 
pent-up emotions of the previous months with "white trash," 
stating further that 'if you were not white trash, you 
would leave me alone." (School officials, according to 
Bates, "never corrected the [white] children concerning 
them calling her "Nigger.") For this verbal assault, Brown 
was expelled from Central High School, while the white 
student received a minor suspension. In an issued 
statement to the press following the incident, Laws decried 
this miscarriage of justice: 
Considering the hideous mockery and hateful 
misery to which the nine Negro children have been 
subjected at Central High School and the almost total 
lack of positive plans by school officials for coping 
with the situation, the recommendation of School 
Superintendent Virgil blossom that Minnie Jean be 
expelled, is a shocking and cruel miscarriage of 
justice •••• After all, ashool [sic] officials were 
totally aware of the intensity of harassment against 
Minnie Jean. They even admit that she was provoked 
to the verba 152etaliation for which expulsion is now 
recommended. 
School officials' lack of policy and swiftness iri 
sanctioning black students when they did occasionally 
retaliate only encouraged segregationist forces, who 
believed that if enough pressure was applied, the black 
students would withdraw from the schoo1. 153 
The experiences of the 'Little Rock 9' once they 
entered Central High, in many ways, paralleled what was 
happening in the Little Rock community. As federal 
authorities were belatedly guaranteeing African Americans a 
minimum of equal rights in education, the white community -
-the majority of whom heretofore remained silent on the 
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issue of school desegregation-- began to move further to 
the right. Rather than tracking down disturbers of the 
peace, like the white mob resisting desegregtion, city 
officials set out to fix 'uppity' blacks in Little Rock. 
Those, like eight of the ten aldermen on the Little Rock 
City Council, were now actively supporting Faubus's 
actions. In late October 1957 the city council passed an 
ordinance, 
requiring any organization, on request by any 
elected official of the city, to supply information 
regarding its membership, donors, amount of 
contributions, and expenditures. This information 
would become a matterof public recofg 4when it was filed with the City clerk's office. 
This kind of legislation, enacted throughout the South, was 
designed to intimidate the NAACP and other civil rights 
organizations. By making public the names of contributors 
and members, many segregationists hoped to thwart the 
effectiveness of the NAACP via a campaign of economic and 
social intimidation. 155 
School officials too were failing to take any 
positive steps toward gaining community acceptance of 
desegregation. In early February 1958, the Little Rock 
School Board petitioned the federal courts for a delay in 
carrying out desegregtion: "It asked that the Negro pupils 
currently enrolled be removed and that integration be 
postponed until January mid-term of 1961." In its 
petition, the school board presented itself as the helpless 
victim in a no win situation. 
The District now finds itself in a most difficult 
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position in providing satisfactory education for its 
pupils. It has the responsiblility of operating 
under the phase plan of integration as directed by 
this court, and yet it has no power to prevent 
interference with the ~girations of its schools under 
the terms of the plan. 
However, the school board was not helpless. It could have 
accepted the failure of its desegregation plan, and it 
could have begun developing a more comprehensive approach, 
involving the entire Little Rock community, as the NAACP 
and the Arkansas Council on Human Rights had suggested as 
early as 1955. 
A day of prayer, called by the ministers of eighty-
tive churches in the Little Rock area, was indictive of the 
slow shift in public discourse, away from school 
segregation to maintenance of sodial stability. The 
ministers' only public - act since the school board's 
announcement on school desegregation, prayer services were 
held throughout the city on 12 October 1957. These 
meetings however, were not in support of school 
desegregation, nor were they meetings in which ministers 
would preach on the moral responsibility of Christians to 
end an immoral and unjust legal practice. The ministers 
were •. • • calling for observance of 'law and order and 
good will among men." Too timid or simply unwilling to 
address Christian immorality of segregation, 
the churchmen do not plan to take sides in the 
matter. A spokesperson said they are t§~ing to find 
a solution by starting on their knees. 
With the exception of Ogdon Dunbar, Jr., no other white 
religious leader in Little Rock was so public in his 
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condemnation of segregation. As late as March 1959, these 
religious leaders had refused to address directly the issue 
of segregtion. In a letter to Dr. Edwin Dahlberg, 
president of the National Council of Churches, Vivian L. 
Brewer wrote, 
From the very beginning of our critical school 
situation, we waited hopefully but in vain for a 
statement from the church. We felt then and feel now 
that a statement such as the enclosed "Out of 
Conviction" signed by 312 ministers of Greater 
Atlanta, issued by the ministers of Greater Little 
Rock would immediately turn the tide of public 
opinion •.•• 158 But no united statement has been forthcoming. 
As a group, the ministers of Little Rock never did take a 
public stand on school segregation. 159 
As federal intervention at Central ended at the 
completion of the school year, the Arkansas state 
legislature in Little Rock aided segregationist forces by 
passing a host of anti-desegregation legislation in the 
spring and summer of 1958. The most damaging of these was 
Act 4. Act 4 empowered the governor to close any school, 
slated for integration under court order, in the state of 
Arkansas. Act 4 also provided a local referendum option on 
which communities could vote to re-open schools and thus 
allow desegregation, or close them and thus prevent court-
ordered desegregation. Although Faubus did close the high 
schools of Little Rock, it was the majority of white voters 
who sanctioned his action in a special "Segregation Versus 
Integration School Election" held on 27 September 1958. A 
majority of the white citizens of Little Rock could not 
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accept even limited desegregation of 'their' public schools 
by the fall of 1958. 19,470 voters opted for school 
closing, while only 7,651 voted in favor of opening 
desegregated schools. Hence, as Eisenhower and his 
attorney general, William Rogers, denied they had any 
constitutional authority to prevent the school closings, 
high schools in Little Rock remained closed for the 1958-
1959 academic year and African Americans once again stood 
alone in their fight for equal rights. 160 
In 1959, civic leaders in Little Rock, businessmen 
associated with the Chamber of Commerce, finally acted. 
However, like the school board which planned only a bare 
minimum desegregation to satisfy the psychic needs of 
whites, they acted out of self-interest. These business 
leaders realized that the events of Little Rock from 1957 
to 1959 were causing serious economic disruption in the 
Little Rock metropolitan area. Between 1950 and 1957, 40 
new industrial plants relocated to the Little Rock area; 
none moved in between 1958 and - 1961. According to a 
January 1959 study commissioned by the Social and Economic 
Issues Committee of the Little Rock branch of the American 
Association of University Women, called "Effect of the 
Little Rock School Situation on Local Business," the school 
situation did affect business activity. Of 85 businessmen 
interviewed, 44 acknowledged that the school situation had 
adversely affected their business, while only 6 said that 
it had a favorable effect on their business activity. (Of 
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those 6, 2 were moving companies.) As one real 
estate/insurance agent responded: 
It has very definitely hurt the real estate business 
-- just about killed it, as a matter of fact. That's 
~articularly in the house sales. First, we're not 
getting any new people into Little Rock. (2) A lot 
of them are moving out -- particularly engineers, and 
people like that with industrial plants here. The 
minute 1 ~! starts affecting their children they leave. 
Some of those who claLmed the school situation had no 
effect on their businesses acknowledged that many of their 
acounts were outside of the Little Rock area. The AAUW 
concluded that 
it is our opinion that present prosperity is due to 
the expansion which took place prior to the school 
crisis. Since the school crisis, no new business has 
moved if 5~ Little Rock, which bodes ill for the future. 
It was this concern that propelled civic leaders in Little 
Rock to initiate a campaign for school reopening under a 
plan of measured and minimum desegregation. Thus the 
white leadership in Little Rock was willing to take action 
in the school situation only when it directly affected 
them, · economically, politically, and socially. They, 
however, were still unwilling to address the crisis in race 
relations. Consequently, two years after schools 
reopened, the number of black students in the 1961-1962 
school year attending previously whites-only senior and 
junior highs schools increased to a mere 45. The school 
board assigned only 78 black students to white-identified 
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schools by the 1963-1964 school year. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Integration with one's context, as 
distinguished from adaptation, is a distinctly human 
activity. Integration results from the capacity to 
adapt oneself to reality plus the critical capacity 
to make choices and transform reality. To the extent 
that man loses his ability to make choices and is 
subjected to the choices of others, to the extent 
that his decisions are no longer his own because they 
result from external prescriptions, he is no longer 
integrated •••• 
The integrated person is person as Subject. In 
contrast, the adaptive person is person as object, 
adaptation representing at most a weak form of self 
defense. If man is incapable of changing reality, he 
adjusts himself instead. Adaptation is behavior 
characteristic of the animal sphere; exhibited by 
man, it is symptomatic of his dehumanization. 
Throughout history men have attempted to overcome the 
factors which make them accomodate or adjust, in a 
struggle--constantly threatened by oppression--to 
attain their full humanity. 
Paul o Fr e ire 1 6 4 
The history of desegregation in Little Rock, 
Arkansas, 1954-1964, was a history of white hegemony over 
black Americans. At its very core, it was a record of 
white racism and of white attempts to maintain black 
subordination. Equally as important, the process of 
desegregation in Little Rock was also a part of a larger 
post-World War II black freedom movement in the United 
States, in which black Americans and white vissionaries 
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challenged and cracked a system of white domination. What 
Bell Hooks wrote in her book, Talking Back, in regards to 
feminist politics, also applies to black efforts in Little 
Rock following the Brown decision. 
Even in the face of powerful structures of 
domination, remains possible for each of us, 
especially those of us who are members of oppressed 
and/or exploited groups as well as those radical 
visionaries who may have race, class, and sex 
privileges, to define and determine alternative 
standar?s, tg5decide on the nature and extent of 
compromise. 
Black Americans 1n Little Rock did offer a more inclusive 
meaning of American citizenship, a new meaning that in this 
author's opinion, has yet to be fully recognized by the 
white majority in the United States. 
Nevertheless, white economic, political, and social 
domination in Little Rock forced blacks to compromise on 
their vision. Nine black students attending classes under 
the protection of 10,000 federal troops, was not their 
vision. As far as the federal courts and the local school 
board were concerned though, Central High School was now 
desegregated; 9 out of a total black high school student 
population of 1,055 constituted desegregation on the high 
school level in the 1957-1958 academic year. 
The black community over the next 15 years 
continued to press, not just for greater desegregation, but 
also for a greater involvement in the desegregation 
process. It would take another 15 years to desegregate 
fully Little Rock's high schools. The school committee 
proposed seven plans for school desegregation. Each was 
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either soundly defeated by referendum or found inadequate 
by the federal courts. Little Rock's public schools were 
still identifiably racially segregated in 1972. Only in 
1973, when "the school district and the minority community 
agreed to work together toward bringing about complete 
desegregation of the schools," were student populations 
consistent with the idea of racial balance in public 
schools. However, this achievement was not without its 
drawbacks for the black community. As the United States 
Commission on Civil Rights concluded in its report, "School 
Desegregation in Little Rock, Arkansas" (1977), 
The black community feels that throughout 
desegregation it has borne the largest share of the 
burden--for example, all-black rather than all-white 
schools were closed. White flight in the late 1960s 
has increased the degree of residential segregation 
in the city. Black administrators and teachers 
continue to complain that they receive unequal 
treatment and opportunity. Black parents 
dissatisfied with the uneqtial burden of busing have 
nonetheless accepted busing because it provides 
opportunj 6tes for their children to attend better 
schools. 
In 1976, a generation later, black citizens of Little Rock 
achieved their vision of racially balanced public schools, 
if not a racially balanced society. 167 
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